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I. INTRODUCTION: OF TEXT AND CONTEXT
Legal text matters. Unlike literature, the text of the
Constitution, a statute, or an administrative regulation is designed
to be coercive, to implement an unequal relationship between a
democratically privileged author and a politically subordinate
reader.1 In a democracy, literary theory assigning hegemony or
even parity to the reader cannot be applied to a public legal text
without doing serious damage to the political order.2 The rub is
1. See Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L. J. 1601, 1601-02 (1985)
(recognizing that judicial interpretation can be seen as a form of "violence" against
individuals who, as a result of a judicial interpretation of the law, may lose their freedom,
property, etc.). Public legal texts are addressed to at least two kinds of readers:
"implementers" and "targets." Implementers are the government officials who carry a law
into effect, ranging from the cop on the beat, to the Chief Justice. Targets are Holmes's "bad
men," whose primary behavior a law is intended to regulate. While it is possible to imagine a
system that applies different rules of reading to implementers and targets, I do not attempt
to explore any potential differences between the two categories of readers. Compare Chevron
U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (granting substantial
authority to implementer) with Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (refusing to grant
authority to target). Most current advice about reading legal text is aimed at implementers,
especially judicial implementers. This Article is no exception. Nor do I attempt in this
Article to explore the reading of private legal texts, like contracts or wills. See Michael
Hancher, Wills as Poems, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 507 (1982); MORTON HOROWITZ, THE
TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1780-1860 180-85 (1977) (construction of contracts).
"2. See RICHARD POSNER, LAW AND LITERATURE: A MISUNDERSTOOD RELATION 209-68
(1988) (arguing that important differences exist between reading law and reading literature).
Judge Posner's approach to law and literature is criticized in Stanley Fish, Don't Know Much
About the Middle Ages: Posner, Law and Literature, 97 YALE L. J. 777 (1988). For a helpful
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that even good-faith judicial readers bent on respecting their
subordinate places in the political order cannot be bound by textual
constraints that are not there.3 Given the limits of language,
imagination, draftsmanship, and politics, many legal texts,
especially the necessarily abstract provisions of a Constitution, do
not do more than establish a set of parentheses around potential
meanings, within which judges arm ambiguous words with coercive
power in particular cases. True, the space within the parentheses is
often a very small one, either because the textual command is
intrinsically obvious, 4 or because collateral institutional behavior,
such as prior judicial construction, 5  legislative activity, 6
survey of recent literary theory ascribing significant creative power to the reader, see
ELIZABETH FREUND, THE RETURN OF THE READER: READER RESPONSE CRITICISM (1987).
3. For examples of criticism questioning the power of legal text to constrain, see, for
example, Sanford Levinson, Law and Literature, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 373 (1982); Roberto
Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement, 96 HARV. L. REV. 561, 576-79
(1987); MARK KELMAN, A GUIDE TO CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 45 (1987); STANLEY FISH, IS
THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS? THE AUTHORITY OF INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES 327 (1980);
Mark Tushnet, A Note on the Revival of Textualism in Constitutional Theory, 58 S. CAL. L.
REV. 683, 684 (1982). For a foundational discussion of the constraining power of language,
see, for example, J.L. AUSTIN, HOW TO DO THINGS WITH WORDS (2d ed. 1975), JAQUES
DERRIDA, GRAMMATOLOGY (Gayatri Charkravorty Spivak trans., 1976), and HENRY STATEN,
WITTGENSTEIN AND DERRIDA (1984).
4. For representative cases in three randomly selected terms (October Terms 1989,
1990, and 1991) where the Supreme Court (or at least five members of the Supreme Court)
believed that textual "plain meaning" was obvious, see, for example, Ardestani v. INS, 502
U.S. 129, 135-37, 139 (1991) (plain meaning of Equal Access to Justice Act precludes award of
attorneys' fees against the United States for unjustified commencement of deportation
proceedings); Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475-76 (1992) (plain meaning of a
"person entitled to compensation" includes those who have not yet received compensation and
those who have yet to have an adjudication in their favor); Bus. Guides v. Chromatic
Communications Enters., 498 U.S. 533, 551 (1992) (plain meaning of Rule 11 renders it
applicable to good faith mistakes by represented parties); Sullivan v. Stroop, 496 U.S. 478,
482-84 (1990) (plain meaning of term "child support" excludes Social Security insurance
benefits); Dep't of the Treasury v. Fed. Labor Relations Admin., 494 U.S. 922, 931-32 (1990)
(plain meaning of text requires rejection of contrary administrative construction). But see
Ardestani, 502 U.S. at 139 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J., arguing the
phrase in question is subject to more than one reading); Cowart, 505 U.S. at 484 (Blackmun,
J., dissenting, joined by Stevens, J. and O'Connor, J.) (same); Bus. Guides, 498 U.S. at 554
(Kennedy, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall, J., Stevens, J., and Scalia, J.) (arguing that
Rule 11's structure and purpose do not support majority's interpretation); Sullivan, 496 U.S.
at 485 (Blackmun, J., dissenting, joined by Brennan, J. and Marshall, J.) (arguing that the
disputed term means just the opposite); Dep't of the Treasury v. Fed. Labor Relations
Admin., 494 U.S. at 934 (Brennan, J., dissenting, joined by Marshall) (same).
5. E.g., Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 868-69 (1992)
(separate opinion of O'Connor, J., Kennedy, J., and Souter, J.) (declining to overrule prior
judicial construction of due process clause as protecting abortion rights); Golden State
Transit Corp. v. City of Los Angeles, 493 U.S. 103, 111-12 (1989) (citing past case law to
support the broad reach of Section 1983 in supplying a remedy for a state violation of the
NLRA); United States v. United Verde Copper Co., 196 U.S. 207, 214 (1905) (declining to
overrule a past judicial interpretation of a statute allowing citizens of U.S. territories to cut
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administrative interpretation, 7 or shared convention8 , has imposed
a clearly preferable meaning. Frequently, though, multiple
plausible9 meanings generate ample space within the parentheses,
providing an inescapable arena for judicial choice. 10
Much of the modern debate over reading legal text is about
how judges should behave when the space within the parenthesis is
substantial." The prescriptions range from putting the text down 12
down timber growing on public lands for use in mining industry). But see Louisville &
Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 152 (1908) (declining to apply prior judicial
construction of "arising under" in Article III to same phrase used in federal question statute);
Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 (1938) (overruling century-old judicial
construction of Rules of Decision Act). For a characteristically perceptive discussion of the
effect of prior judicial construction on the meaning of the Constitution, see Henry Paul
Monaghan, Stare Decisis and Constitutional Adjudication, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 723 (1988).
6. Collateral legislative activity can shed light on the meaning of text in at least three
ways: (1) traditional statements of purpose in legislative history; (2) legislative ratification of
a preexisting meaning through reenactment or silence; and (3) legislative rejection. For
examples of each, see, for example, NLRB v. Bell Aeroscope Co., 416 U.S. 267, 275 (1974)
(subsequent legislation helpful in determining meaning of prior statute); FAA v. Robertson,
422 U.S. 255, 265-67 (1975) (subsequent Congressional amendment and oversight indicates
acceptance of prior meaning); Seatrain Shipbuilding Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 444 U.S. 572, 595-96
(1980) (view of subsequent Congress helpful in construing ambiguous phrase); Youngstown
Sheet & Tube v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 586 (1952) (relevance of legislative rejection).
7. Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 844 (1984);
A.B.F. Freight Systems v. NLRB, 510 U.S. 317, 324 (1994).
8. STANLEY FISH, supra note 3, at 342-44; Stanley Fish, Working on the Chain Gang:
Interpretation in Law and Literature, 60 TEX. L. REV. 551, 551-52 (1982); David Millon,
Objectivity and Democracy, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 54-55 (1992); Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage
Factories and Syllogism Machines, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 420 (1992).
9. 1 use the word "plausible" instead of "possible" because linguistic and professional
conventions place real limits on the legal meaning of most texts. A ban on "quartering"
soldiers must talk about lodging them, not tearing them to pieces. A "right to bear arms"
cannot be read to establish an allotment for taxidermists or freedom for illiterate nudity.
10. Steven L. Carter, Constitutional Adjudication and the Indeterminate Text: A
Preliminary Defense of an Imperfect Muddle, 94 YALE L. J. 821, 821 (1985). See generally
WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON LEGISLATION: STATUTES AND THE
CREATION OF PUBLIC POLICY 670 (1987) (recognizing that "statutory interpretation in the
hard cases involves substantial judicial discretion and political judgment").
11. For thoughtful discussions of the issue, see Richard Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal
Realism and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE. WES. L. REV. 179
(1986); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PENN L. REV. 1479
(1987).
12. Frank J. Easterbrook, Statutes'Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 534 (1983); Frank
J. Easterbrook, The Role of Original Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB.
POLY 59, 65-66 (1988). Judge Easterbrook's plea to put some ambiguous statutes down,
thereby remanding the issue to the legislature, resembles the ban imposed by the French
National Assembly on judicial construction of ambiguous statutes in the years immediately
following the French Revolution. Beginning in 1790, French judges were obliged, under
penalty of criminal prosecution, to refer ambiguous statutes to a committee of the National
Assembly for definitive legislative interpretation. Law of 16-24 Aug. 1790, Title II, arts. 2, 3,
10, and 12; 1 DUVERGIER, COLLECTION COMPLET DES LOIS, 361, 363 (1924), quoted in SIR
OTTO KAHN.FREUND ET AL., A SOURCEBOOK ON FRENCH LAw 211-13 (2d ed. 1979). The
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and/or resorting to the dictionary, 13 to searching for real 14 or
presumed 15 authorial guidance, to elaborate efforts to construct
"neutral" tie-breaking mechanisms, 16 to avowed interstitial judicial
policy-making. 17
reference system was a disaster. Once the identities of the interested parties became known,
the political nature of the National Assembly precluded a principled decision. The remand
system was replaced in 1804 by Article 4 of the Code Napoleon making it a crime for a
French judge to refuse to construe an ambiguous statute. CODE NAPOLEON art 4 (1804). The
text of Article 4 reads: Le juge qui refusera de juger sous pretext du silence, de l'obscurite ou
de l'insuffisance de la loi, pourra etre poursuivi comme coupable de deni de justice.
13. Justice Scalia has argued most forcefully for use of dictionary meaning. See, e.g.,
U.S. v. Dixon, 509 U.S. 688, 705 n.10 (1993) (relying on Black's Law Dictionary to interpret
the phrase "in connection with a commercial activity"); Republic of Argentina v. Weltover,
504 U.S. 607, 614-15 (1991) (referring to various dictionaries to interpret the term
"incident"); California v. Hodari D., 499 U.S. 621, 624 (1991) (referring to Webster's
Dictionary to interpret the term "seizure").
14. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CHI. L. REV. 849, 852-
65 (1989) (debating the strengths and weaknesses of originalism and nonoriginalism); Robert
Bork, Original Intent and the Constitution, 7 HUMANITIES, Feb. 1986, at 26 (explaining that
"[the originalist attempts to discern the principles the Framers enacted, the values they
sought to protect"); RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987). The classic
attack on originalism is Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding,
60 B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980). For sophisticated discussions of whether the Founders themselves
viewed their individual intentions as relevant in construing the Constitution, see H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARV. L. REV. 885, 888,
948 (1985) (arguing that the Founders did not consider authorial or ratifier intent to be
relevant) and Charles A. Lofgren, The Original Understanding of Original Intent?, 5 CONST.
COMMENTARY 77, 111 (1988) (arguing that the Founders believed ratifiers' but not authors'
intent was relevant). A number of helpful essays on the originalist debate are collected in
INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION: THE DEBATE OVER ORIGINAL INTENT (Jack N. Rakove ed.,
1990).
15. Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 60 TEXAS L. REV. 527, 527-30 (1980);
RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE ch. 2 (1986); HENRY HART AND ALBERT SACKS, THE LEGAL
PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND APPLICATION OF LAW 1411 (tent. ed. 1958);
Richard Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the
Constitution, 37 CASE WES. L. REV. 179, 212-17 (1986).
16. CASS SUNSTEIN, AFTER THE RIGHTS REVOLUTION: RECONCEIVING THE REGULATORY
STATE 114 (1990). But see Karl Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and
the Rules or Canons About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 401-06
(1950).
17. Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., The Constitution of the United States:
Contemporary Ratification Address (1985), in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 23 (Jack
Rakove ed., 1990); Justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Address (July 22, 1983), in 6 U. HAW L.
REV. 1, 3-7 (1984); Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community and Tradition
in William J. Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 VA. L. REV. 1261, 1262 (1991);
Stanley J. Friedelbaum, Justice Brennan and the Burger Court: Policy Making in the Judicial
Thicket, 19 SETON HALL L. REV. 188, 211, 216-19 (1989); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Spinning
Legislative Supremacy, 78 GEO. L. J. 319, 330-33 (1990); see also Burt Neuborne, The Origin
of Rights: Democracy, the Stork, and the Democratic Dilemma, in THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS AND RESPONSIBILITIES 145 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1992)
[hereinafter Neuborne, The Origin of Rights]; Burt Neuborne, Background Norms For
Federal Statutory Interpretation, 22 CONN. L. REV. 721, 725 (1990); Burt Neuborne, State
Constitutions and the Evolution of Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 899-901 (1989).
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Although the prescriptions vary dramatically, common to
virtually every modern approach to reading legal text is the
paramount importance of context and structure.18 Whatever one's
philosophy of text, 19 unmoored words ripped from their contextual
surroundings are notoriously arbitrary raw material for judicial
ascription of coercive meaning. 20 Two garden-variety cases decided
during the 1992 Term of the Supreme Court illustrate the Justices'
intense-and admirable--preoccupation with context and structure.
In Rowland v. Men's Advisory Council,21 the Court struggled with
whether the word "person" as used in 28 U.S.C. Section 1915
(authorizing in forma pauperis litigation) included an association of
prison inmates or was confined to individual prisoners. 22 The
Dictionary Act 23 provided a plausible "plain meaning" textual
solution, directing that "person" be read to include natural persons
and associations. 24 But Justice Souter, writing for five members of
18. Any attempt to use structure as a tool in understanding text, especially
constitutional text, owes an enormous debt to Charles Black. See CHARLES BLACK,
STRUCTURE AND RELATIONSHIP IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1969); see also CHARLES BLACK,
PERSPECTIVES IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (1963); CHARLES BLACK, ESSAYS MOSTLY ON LAW
(1963); Charles Black, On Worrying About the Constitution, 55 U. COLO. L. REV. 469 (1984).
My approach to structure differs somewhat from Professor Black's. He argues that the
existence of certain institutions implies rights and duties needed to make them work. Thus,
his appeal to structure is driven primarily by institutional efficiency. My effort to use
structure as a guide to meaning is not driven by institutions, but by the formal order of words
and ideas in a text. See FRANK KERMODE, THE ART OF TELLING: ESSAYS ON FICTION (1983). I
do not believe the two approaches are mutually exclusive. Indeed, they are complementary.
19. Much of the current debate over the nature of legal text turns on whether it is
"transparent," acting primarily as a window into a deeper, authoritative legislative will, or
"opaque," a freestanding, self-contained phenomenon that subsumes the authors' subjective
intentions in an objective legal act. Under either an "opaque" or "transparent" view of text,
careful consideration of structure and context is a helpful guide to reading it. If, as most
judges appear to assume, legal text is "transparent," paying close attention to structure may
well be the best evidence of what the authors intended. If, on the other hand, authorial
intention is subordinate to the independent reality of an "opaque" text, respect for structure
is a critical means of avoiding the potential for arbitrariness and incoherence that the literal
reading of an "opaque" text always risks.
20. I take it that is what Learned Hand meant when he warned that "[wiords are not
pebbles in alien juxtaposition," NLRB v. Federbush Co., 123 F.2d 954, 956 (2d Cir. 1941), and
what Justice Holmes meant when he opined that "[a] word is ... the skin of a living thought."
Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918).
21. 506 U.S. 194 (1993).
22. Id. at 196-97. Under 28 U.S.C. Section 1915(a), a qualifying indigent "person" may
"commenc[e], prosecut[e] or defen[d] ... any suit, action or proceeding, civil or criminal, or
appeal therein, without prepayment of fees and costs or security therefore." Pursuant to
Section 1915(d), the court may provide such a "person" with appointed counsel.
23. 1 U.S.C. § 1 (1958).
24. The Dictionary Act provides: "[i]n determining the meaning of any Act of Congress,
unless the context indicates otherwise ... the wordf person... include[s] corporations,
companies, associations, firms, partnerships, societies and joint stock companies, as well as
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the Court, discerned signals sent by the whole document that
trumped the text of the Dictionary Act. Since, Justice Souter
reasoned, a "person" acting under Section 1915 must execute a
qualifying affidavit and may appear pro se, the statute's contextual
signals pointed to a natural person, not an association.25
Context and structure fared even better (and literal text
fared even worse) in U.S. National Bank of Oregon v. Independent
Insurance Agents,26 in which the issue was whether a "scrivener's
error" in a 1918 recodification, resulting in improper punctuation
materially affecting the statute's meaning, could be ignored by the
courts.27 The Supreme Court held unequivocally that if context and
structure is clear enough, it can supplant even the literal text.
Justice Souter, writing for a unanimous Court, stated:
Over and over we have stressed that "[in expounding a statute, we must not be
guided by a single sentence or member of a sentence, but look to the provisions of the
whole law, and to its object and policy.". . . No more than isolated words or sentences
is punctuation alone a reliable guide for discovery of a statute's meaning. Statutory
construction "is a holistic endeavor". . . and, at a minimum, must account for a
statute's full text, language as well as punctuation, structure and subject matter.2 8
individuals." Construing the word "person" in different contexts is a legal cottage industry.
See JOHN NOONAN, "PERSONS" AND MASKS OF THE LAW: CARDOZO, HOLMES, JEFFERSON AND
WYTHE AS MAKERS OF MASKS (1976); Sanford A. Schane, The Corporation Is a Person: The
Language of Legal Fiction, 61 YALE. L. J. 563 (1987); Julie Elizabeth Rice, Fetal Rights:
Defining "Person" Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 1983 U. ILL. L. REV. 347. For judicial examples of
the effort to give meaning to the term "person," see, e.g., Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police,
491 U.S. 58, 64 (1989) (state not a person under 42 U.S.C. § 1983); United States v. Cooper
Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 604 (1941) (United States not a person under Sherman Act); Georgia v.
Evans, 316 U.S. 159, 162-63 (1942) (State of Georgia is a person under Sherman Act).
25. Rowland, 506 U.S. at 199-209. Justice Thomas, writing for Justices Blackmun,
Stevens, and Kennedy, disagreed, arguing that the majority's contextual signals were too
equivocal to override the textual command of the Dictionary Act. Id. at 212.
26. 508 U.S. 439 (1993).
27. The precise question in U.S. National Bank was whether a provision of the United
States Code enacted in 1916 authorizing national banks to sell insurance in small
communities had been inadvertently repealed by the concededly erroneous placement of
quotation marks in a 1918 recodification. The 1952 codifiers of the United States Code took
the position that the literal placement of the quotation marks caused the provision to be
repealed. Congressional staffers agreed. Hearings on H.R. 107 and H.R. 6885 Before the
Subcomm. on Bank Supervision and Ins. of the House Committee on Banking and Currency,
89th Cong. 391 (1965). So did the D.C. Circuit in Indep. Ins. Agents v. Clarke, 955 F.2d 731,
737 (D.C. Cir. 1992). Regulatory agencies ignored the errant punctuation.
28. U.S. Nat'l Bank, 508 U.S. at 455. For a third example of the power of context and
structure during the 1992 Term of the Court, see Musick, Peeler & Garrett v. Employers Ins.
of Wausau, 508 U.S. 286 (1993). In Musick, the Court used the contextual geography of the
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934 to derive a right of contribution in Rule 10(b)(5) actions. Id.
at 294-97. The Court reasoned that since Congress had actually provided for rights of
contribution in two causes of action explicitly established by the securities acts, it probably
would have wished to provide a right of contribution in a judicially implied 10(b)(5) claim. Id.
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Reasonable people can differ with the Court's outcomes in
both Rowland and U.S. National Bank.29 Weighing ambiguous text
against context and structure is not an exact science. But the
process of looking for coercive meaning in the context and structure
of the document in which the word appears, and not merely at the
literal surface of a word or in an increasingly unpersuasive
ascription of will to a fictive author seems unimpeachable. 30 Surely,
this is how we should seek to read our most important legal
text-the Bill of Rights.
But we do not even try to read the Bill of Rights as a
structural whole. 31 Instead, we read it as a set of self-contained
commands, as if each Amendment, indeed, each clause of each
Amendment, and at times, each word of each clause of each
Amendment, had been conceived in splendid isolation.32
at 296-97. When, however, Congress explicitly establishes a cause of action, the Court has
refused to infer a right of contribution, deeming Congress's failure to have provided for
contribution explicitly as conclusive. Northwest Airlines, Inc. v. Transport Workers, 451 U.S.
77, 94-95 (1981); Texas Indus., Inc. v Radcliffe Materials, Inc., 451 U.S. 630, 639-40 (1981).
Ironically, as with the Court's similar treatment of preemption clauses, Musick suggests that
sometimes Congress is better off saying nothing than saying too little. See Cipollone v.
Liggett Group Inc., 505 U.S. 504, 517 (1992) (stating that Congress's enactment of a provision
defining the preemptive reach of a statute implies that matters beyond that reach are not
preempted). For a discussion of the canon inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, see infra note
96 and accompanying text.
29. Rowland was a 5-4 case. U.S. National Bank was unanimous, but the D.C. Circuit
did not believe that it was empowered to ignore the literal text. 955 F.2d 731, 734-35 (D.C.
Cir. 1992). Musick was also closely contested. Justices Thomas, Blackmun and O'Connor
dissented from Justice Kennedy's opinion for the Court. Musick, 508 U.S. at 298.
30. I do not wish to be drawn into the debate over whether a legal text is a self-
contained phenomenon or whether it is merely evidence of authorial will. Under either
assumption, the use of structure and context as an aid in reading text can only enhance the
project. If the text is self-contained, reference to structure and context provide an important
check against the risk of arbitrariness and incoherence latent in both the dictionary and
plain meaning approaches. If the text is merely evidence of authorial will, structure and
context are important clues in deciding what that will is.
31. Others have noted the failure to read the Bill of Rights holistically. EDWARD
DUMBAULD, THE BILL OF RIGHTS AND WHAT IT MEANS TODAY 140-44 (1957); Jay Wishnograd,
The Bill ofRights, 10 PACE L. REV. 609, 610 (1990).
32. For one of the few efforts to read the Bill of Rights holistically, see AKHIL REED
AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECONSTRUCTION (1998); AKHIL REED AMAR, THE
CONSTITUTION AND CRIMINAL PROCEDURE (1997); Akhil Reed Amar, The Bill of Rights as a
Constitution, 100 YALE L. J. 1131, 1132 (1991). Professor Amar's provocative invitation to
read the Bill of Rights as a communitarian document yields the powerful insight of a close
structural relationship among voting, jury service, and military service. Id. at 1164.
Professor Amar has applied his holistic technique to the Second Amendment. Akhil Reed
Amar, The Second Amendment: A Case Study in Constitutional Interpretation, 2001 UTAH L.
REV. 889, 889-90 (2001) [hereinafter The Second Amendment]. There is an obvious affinity
between Professor Amar's reading of the Bill of Rights and my suggested approach.
Professor Amar appeals to communitarian values and uses intratextual comparison. I stress
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II. THE BILL OF RIGHTS IN SPLENDID ISOLATION
We rarely ask why the Bill of Rights is ordered as it is. We
do not ask why the First Amendment is first 3 3 and why the Eighth
follows the Sixth and Seventh. We do not ask why the Fourth comes
before the Fifth and why the Ninth and Tenth close the document.
We do not ask why the almost ignored Second and Third have pride
of place over the majestic Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth.
Nor do we ask whether there is a rhyme or reason for the
internal order of each amendment. We do not ask why the religion
clause treats establishment before free exercise, why the religion
clauses precede the speech clause, why both religion and speech
precede press, or why the First Amendment closes with the
assembly and petition clauses. We do not ask why the Due Process
Clause comes after the grand jury and self-incrimination clauses,
and what the Takings Clause is doing in the same amendment with
double jeopardy and self-incrimination.
In short, we do not ask whether an organizational plan
informs the Bill of Rights, whether a structural design exists that
can help us read the majestic text holistically. Instead, we read our
most precious legal document as though the Founders had thrown a
pot of ink at the wall, with the formal order of the Bill of Rights
shaped by the splatter. Law professors are among the worst
culprits, slicing the Bill of Rights into bite-sized pieces and
parceling the fragments out in separate courses.34 It is routine for
an American law student to graduate without once having been
the formal order of the words and ideas, in large part because I want to avoid being forced to
choose between communitarian and libertarian readings.
33. It is, of course, true that what we call the First Amendment was actually third, since
the first two proposed amendments, altering the enumeration rules governing the size of
Congress and deferring the effect of Congressional pay raises until the next Congress, were
not ratified by a sufficient number of States. Both failed amendments were, however, clearly
aimed at correcting perceived flaws in the original text of the Constitution. The addition of a
Bill of Rights designed to enumerate and protect basic freedoms clearly begins with the
current First Amendment. The text of the original twelve amendments submitted to the
states for ratification is set forth in ANNALS OF CONGRESS 808-09 (Joseph Gales ed., 1834)
[hereinafter ANNALS OF CONGRESS]. See infra note 120 for a discussion of the evolution of
the Bill of Rights' final structure. In 1992, the provisions deferring the effective date of a
Congressional pay raise until the next Congress were finally ratified by a sufficient number
of state legislatures to qualify as the Twenty-seventh Amendment. Whether a ratification
process that lasts for more than 200 years is effective is beyond the scope of this Article,
although it is highly unlikely that the issue will ever be raised in the context of an
amendment that codifies universal political reality.
34. See Howard W. Gutman, Academic Determinism: The Division of the Bill of Rights,
54 S. CAL. L. REV. 295, 327-31 (1981) (describing how the liberties protected by the Bill of
Rights are presented as discrete subjects in law school curricula).
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asked to read the Bill of Rights from beginning to end. The First
and Fourteenth Amendments, or some morsels of them, get taught
in Constitutional Law, along with mention of fragments of the Fifth
Amendment and, occasionally, the Ninth Amendment. The First
Amendment itself is ruthlessly divided into religion and speech
components, with little attention paid to press, and assembly, and
nothing at all to petition. The Fourth Amendment and fragments of
the Fifth, Sixth, and Eighth Amendments are taught in Criminal
Procedure. The Seventh Amendment is taught in Civil Procedure.
The Tenth Amendment is discussed, if at all, in Federal Courts, and
the Second and Third Amendments have passed into academic
oblivion, although the Second may be making a modest comeback.
Nor do American judges attempt to read the provisions of
the Bill of Rights in structural context, opting instead to parse the
clause-bound text of each amendment, pulling small clusters of
words from the whole and treating each cluster as if it were a self-
contained command. 35 We are simply not in the habit of looking for
an organizational structure, deep or otherwise, in the Bill of Rights
in order to read the document holistically.
If, as we appear to assume, the Bill of Rights is a collection
of random commands without an organizing principle, the current
practice of treating each clause as a randomly-ordered, self-
contained whole is inevitable. I believe, however, that an organizing
principle undergirds the Bill of Rights---an organizing principle
unique in our rights-bearing tradition that, once acknowledged,
helps to give coherent meaning to the components that make up the
whole. In short, I believe that we should read the Bill of Rights not
as a set of commands shouted out in random order by the Founders,
but as a great poem celebrating human freedom, with a deep
structure that explains why each idea is in its proper place and that
advances the poem's themes of democracy, freedom, and human
dignity.
35. I will not seek to document the assertion that most American judges do not attempt
to take structure and context into account when reading the Bill of Rights. The phenomenon
of reading the Bill of Rights in a clause-bound way is so pervasive that virtually any
constitutional case supports the proposition. For a relatively rare example of a judicial effort
to read the Bill of Rights holistically, see Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 478 (1928)
(Brandeis, J., dissenting). See also Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 621-24 (1886)
(seeking to build a zone of privacy from the holistic impact of the Fourth Amendment ban on
unreasonable seizures and the Fifth Amendment ban on self-incrimination). The attempt at
holistic reading has since been rejected. See, e.g., Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 405-
14 (1976); United States v. Doe, 465 U.S. 605, 610 n.8 (1984); United States v. Leon, 468 U.S.
897, 905-06 (1984). See generally Note, The Life and Times of Boyd v. United States (1886-
1976), 76 MICH. L. REV. 184 (1977) (discussing how Boyd has been replaced by more narrow
readings of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments).
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My project must clear at least three hurdles. First, I must
demonstrate that a discernible organizational plan underlies the
Bill of Rights, informing the order in which our rights are described
and catalogued. Second, I must assemble evidence that the order of
the Bill of Rights was the result of choice, and not random
accident. 36 Finally, in a later series of pieces, I must persuade a
reader that recognition of, and respect for, the structural plan
undergirding the Bill of Rights can help us to read its necessarily
ambiguous text in a more coherent and principled manner.
III. DOES THE BILL OF RIGHTS HAVE A COHERENT ORGANIZING
PRINCIPLE?
The search for an organizing principle for the Bill of Rights
begins with description. By my count, the first ten amendments
contain thirty-one ideas, in the following order:37
36. Even if the Founders had stumbled onto the structure of the Bill of Rights by
chance, the document's disciplined organization would provide an elegant and principled aid
in reading it. The power of the document's deep structure as an aid in interpretation is,
however, enhanced if I can demonstrate that the Founders intended to impose the structure.
By stressing the intentionality of the document's structure, I hope to avoid the debate
between originalism and more flexible theories of interpretation.
37. See SOURCES OF OUR LIBERTIES 425-29 (Richard L. Perry and John C. Cooper eds.,
1959) (featuring a similar effort to catalogue the contents of the Bill of Rights); see also THE
BILL OF RIGHTS: ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 218 (Eugene V. Hickok
ed., 1991).
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1. No establishment of religion




6. Petition for redress of
grievances
7. Right to keep and bear arms
8. No quartering troops
9. No unreasonable searches
10. No unreasonable seizures
11. Necessity of warrants
12. Requirement of probable
cause
13. Right to Grand Jury
14. No double jeopardy
15. No compulsory self-
incrimination
16. No deprivation of life,
liberty, or property without
due process of law
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17. No taking of property for
private use
18. Just compensation
19. Impartial criminal jury
trial
20. Speedy and public trial
21. Criminal venue - vicinage
22. Notice of charges
23. Right of confrontation
24. Compulsory process for
defendants
25. Counsel in criminal cases
26. Civil jury trial
27. No excessive bail
28. No excessive fines
29. No cruel & unusual
punishments
30. Enumerated rights do not
preclude other rights
31. Powers not delegated to
national government are
reserved to states and people
In searching for a formal organizing principle, the Bill of
Rights should be viewed both "vertically," by looking at the formal
order of the ten amendments, and "horizontally," by looking at the
order of the ideas within each amendment.
A. The Vertical Organization of the Bill of Rights
The first ten amendments demonstrate a remarkably
coherent "vertical" structure, a structure that is unique in the
history of rights-bearing documents in our legal culture. 38
The First Amendment unites the six luminous ideas that
describe the Founders' substantive vision of an ideal democratic
commonwealth: a place of religious toleration, expressive freedom,
and robust political activity. The Second and Third Amendments
protect the ideal commonwealth against military subversion. The
38. For a comparison between the structure of the Bill of Rights and the structure of
antecedent rights-bearing documents, see infra Part W.A.-D. For an explanation of why the
first two original amendments, dealing with Congressional apportionment and Congressional
pay raises do not count as integral provisions of the Founders' Bill of Rights, see supra note
33.
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Fourth through Eighth Amendments chronologically catalogue the
risks to the ideal democratic commonwealth from law enforcement
authorities -- and set forth structural protections against each risk.
The Ninth and Tenth Amendments close the Bill of Rights by
telling future generations how to read the constitutional text when
rights and/or powers are at stake.
The First Amendment 39 is first, not because of random
placement, but because the Founders viewed it as the substantive
centerpiece of their efforts, a description of the ideal democratic
commonwealth they hoped to found. The first six textual ideas in
the Bill of Rights, gathered together in a single text for the first
time, recapitulate the life-cycle of a democratic idea, moving in six
expanding concentric textual circles from the generative phase of an
idea within the mind of a free individual, to the initial expression of
the idea to others, to the widespread discussion of the idea with the
mass of citizens, to concerted action on behalf of the idea, and,
finally, to formal interaction with government in support of the
idea.
The Founders understood that the utopian democratic polity
imagined in the First Amendment's six ideas was, and is, a fragile
one. In an effort to defend it, they surveyed the perceived dangers
to their ideal commonwealth, ranked them painstakingly by
category and seriousness, organized them chronologically, and
provided twenty-three precisely targeted structural antidotes in the
Second through Eighth Amendments.
The Second and Third Amendments respond to the
Founders' worst nightmare-the fear of military subversion. 40 The
Second Amendment is second, not because of random placement,
but because the Founders viewed protection against military
39. The First Amendment provides: "Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of
speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition for
redress of grievances." U.S. CONST. amend. I. The precursors of the First Amendment are
discussed infra at Part III.B.1. No precursor prefigures the organization and structure of the
First Amendment's six ideas.
40. The Second Amendment provides: "A well regulated Militia, being necessary to the
security of a free State, the right of the people to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
U.S. CONST. amend. II. The Third Amendment provides: "No soldier shall in time of peace be
quartered in any house, without the consent of the Owner, nor in time of war, but in a
manner prescribed by law." U.S. CONST. amend. III. The Founders' understanding that
armed subversion by a military force that does not reflect the population as a whole is the
chief threat to a democratic polity was remarkably prescient. The fate of many democracies
has been shaped more by the sword than the ballot. While even a fully representative
military poses a threat to democracy, most putches have involved a relatively insular military
force that differs in ethnic, racial, and economic background from the target population.
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subversion as the next most important task after the description of
the ideal democratic commonwealth. Once military subversion had
been dealt with in the Second and Third Amendments, the
Founders turned to the next most troublesome threat to the First
Amendment's ideal commonwealth-abuse of the law enforcement
power. The Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Eighth Amendments
are a meticulously organized, chronological overview of the criminal
justice system, with structural protections against abuse imposed
at each stage. The Fourth Amendment monitors the investigation
stage, placing it under judicial supervision by requiring warrants
and probable cause prior to search, seizure, or arrest.41 The Fifth
Amendment deals with interrogation and formal accusation,
providing safeguards to an individual once the investigation stage
has narrowed the focus to a particular suspect. 42 The Sixth and
Seventh Amendments govern adjudication in criminal and civil
contexts, assuring a fair trial once a defendant has been formally
41. The Fourth Amendment provides:
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or affirmation,
and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things to
be seized. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
42. The Fifth Amendment provides:
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous crime,
unless on presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except in cases arising in
the land or naval forces, or in the militia, when in actual service in time of War or
public danger; nor shall any person be subject for the same offence to be twice put
in jeopardy of life or limb; nor shall be compelled in any criminal case to be a
witness against himself, or be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due
process of law; nor shall private property be taken for public use, without just
compensation.
U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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charged or sued.43 The Eighth Amendment limits the power to
punish, once an accused has been found guilty.44
It is possible, of course, that the chronological precision with
which the Fourth through Eighth Amendments track investigation,
interrogation, accusation, adjudication, and punishment is simply
an accident. But I doubt it. The best reading is to accept the Fourth
through Eighth Amendments as a holistic package, to be read in
harmony with the rest of the Bill of Rights.
Finally, the Founders ended the Bill of Rights on a logical
note with thoughtful instructions to future generations about how
to read the Constitution's text. The last two ideas in the Bill of
Rights, codified in the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, attempt to
deal with the pitfalls inherent in relying on something as slippery
as words both to describe human rights and to limit the powers of a
feared sovereign. 45 The debate over the efficacy and wisdom of a
Bill of Rights indicates that the Founders had a sophisticated
understanding of the risks inherent in using words to catalogue
fundamental human rights and to delineate the boundaries of a
complex federal system. They understood that future readers would
have a choice between two hermeneutic traditions. One tradition,
linked to the British concept of "equity of the statute," would invite
future readers to extend the literal text to analogous settings under
43. The Sixth Amendment provides:
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy and
public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district where the crime shall
have been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by
law, and to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted
by the witnesses against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor, and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.
U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
The Seventh Amendment provides:
In suits at common law, where the value of the controversy shall exceed twenty
dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried by a jury,
shall be otherwise re-examined in any Court of the United States, than according
to the rules of the common law.
U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
44. The Eighth Amendment provides: "Excessive bail shall not be required, nor
excessive fines imposed, nor cruel and unusual punishment inflicted." U.S. CONST. amend.
VIII.
45. The Ninth Amendment provides: 'The enumeration in the Constitution of certain
rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the people." U.S.
CONST. amend. IX. The Tenth Amendment provides: "The powers not delegated to the
United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the
States respectively, or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X.
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appropriate circumstances.4 6 The rival tradition, linked to the
canon of inclusio unius est exclusio alterius, would forbid future
readers from going beyond the strict literal text. Simply put, I
argue that the Founders closed the Bill of Rights by announcing
two metacanons of constitutional construction embracing the
concept of textual expansion through analogy when future disputes
about rights were at stake,47 while forbidding the use of analogy as
a device to increase government power. The eminently sensible
instruction to future generations to read the rights-bearing
provisions of the Bill of Rights generously, while reading the power-
granting provisions of the Constitution narrowly, may well have
been the Founders' greatest structural triumph.
Such a careful vertical order may have been random, but I
doubt it.
B. The Horizontal Organization of the Bill of Rights
A careful plan is also evident when one views the
"horizontal" organization of each amendment, as well as the
"vertical" structure of the first ten amendments as a whole.
Consider, for example, the unmistakable "inside out" horizontal
order of ideas in the First Amendment.
1. The First Amendment: The Life-Cycle of a Democratic Idea
The First Amendment rightly begins in the interior recesses
of the human spirit with protection of religious conscience. The
Founders understood that respect for the interior freedom of the
mind is the indispensable starting point of democratic politics. The
Establishment Clause operates deep inside the individual psyche,
in the private precincts of religious conscience, by assuring that no
person is forced to affirm or support a religious belief he or she does
not hold.48 The iconic role played by West Virginia Board of
46. See generally John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101
COLUM. L. REV. 1 (2001) (criticizing Equity of the Statute doctrine as an inadequate tool for
modern Constitutional interpretation).
47. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 460 (1958) (using analogy to expand beyond
literal text of the First Amendment to insert a nontextual idea - freedom of association).
48. See Everson v. Bd. of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 8-16 (1947) (reciting the history of the
Establishment Clause). Madison was unable to persuade his colleagues to expand the
protection of religious conscience in the Establishment Clause to a general protection of
conscience. See infra note 151 and text accompanying note 186. Whether the Free Speech
Clause should be read to expand the protection of religious conscience by analogy to cover
aspects of secular conscience is discussed infra text accompanying note 187. See generally
United States v. Seeger, 380 U.S. 163, 187-88 (1965) (holding that an individual met the
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Education v. Barnette49 in our First Amendment jurisprudence
flows, not merely from Justice Jackson's inspired rhetoric, but from
our intuitive recognition that coerced affirmations of belief,
especially religious belief, gnaw at the human spirit like nothing
else.
The Free Exercise Clause takes an incremental step
outwards, protecting the ability to manifest deeply felt religious
beliefs. Although some tension has arisen between the two Religion
Clauses in the modern era,50 their side-by-side placement in the
text reveals that they are two sides of the protection of internal
belief: the Establishment Clause protects against coercion of belief
while the Free Exercise Clause protects its expression. 51
The Free Speech Clause, the third idea in the text, continues
the movement outward toward increasing interaction with other
persons. The transitional nature of the Free Speech Clause is
reflected in its Janus-like nature, looking inward toward the self-
expressive nature of speech, and outward toward the instrumental
effect of speech on others. 52 Not surprisingly, the twin concerns of
individual dignity and institutional efficiency underlying modern
First Amendment theory mirror the transitional nature of the Free
Speech Clause.
requirement of belief in a "Supreme Being" needed to qualify as a conscientious objector
where the individual's motives for refusing service were primarily secular); Welsh v. United
States, 398 U.S. 333, 343-44 (1970) (holding that a secular belief that opposed war is
sufficient to qualify as a conscientious objector).
49. 319 U.S. 624 (1943). We often overlook the fact that the objection to compulsory flag
salutes in Barnette was religiously based. Id. at 629.
50. For examples of the tension between a ban on governmental activity that fosters
religion and an effort to assist individuals in freely exercising their religion, see, for example,
Zobrest v. Catalina Foothills School Dist., 509 U.S. 1, 13-14 (1993) (holding that a deaf
student enrolled in a private school is entitled to sign language interpreter at public
expense); Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. Of Virginia, 515 U.S. 819, 842-45
(1995) (providing funding to religious student organization at public university is not a
violation of the Establishment Clause); Zelman v. Simmons-Harris, 536 U.S. 639, 652-53
(2002) (holding that voucher program authorizing expenditure of state funds in school of
parents' choice did not violate the Establishment Clause where money could be spent in
religious schools); Locke v. Davy, 124 S.Ct. 1307 (2004) (rejecting free exercise challenge to
refusal to fund devotional studies).
51. The Court's willingness in Employment Division v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), to
uphold unintended government violations of religious conscience without requiring a showing
of serious social need appears inconsistent with the structural primacy accorded to conscience
by the Founders.
52. See ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT 57 (1948) ("Individual self-seeking has been given the same constitutional
rating as national provision for the general welfare."); Edmund Cahn, The "Firstness" of the
First, 65 YALE L. J. 464, 470-475 (1956) ("[T]he freedoms embodied in the First Amendment
must always secure paramountcy.").
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The Free Press Clause continues the outward movement,
protecting forms of communication aimed at a mass audience. The
Free Assembly Clause intensifies the inside out progression,
protecting interaction with others in pursuit of collective goals.
Finally, the Petition Clause closes the First Amendment by
protecting the right to interact with government itself.
Given the inside out progression of the First Amendment,
the outward-looking political act of petitioning for redress of
grievances could not come before the Janus-like act of speech, and
neither could precede the inward-looking concerns with religious
conscience and belief. Despite such a precise organizational plan,
however, I know of no case seeking to use the First Amendment's
inside out structure as a help in reading its components. At a
minimum, the careful inside out progression of ideas in the First
Amendment reflects two important truths that should help us in
reading it: (1) the structural primacy the Founders granted to belief
and conscience, especially religious conscience; and (2) the
sophistication of the Founders' understanding of the deep structure
of democratic self-government. The formal order of the First
Amendment draws a road map of democracy for us, from the
genesis of an idea in the mind of a free citizen, to its initial
communication to others, to mass dissemination of the idea, to
collective action in advancement of the idea, to formal
enshrinement of the idea in law.
2. The Second and Third Amendments: Preventing Military
Overthrow
The most immediate danger to the ideal commonwealth
envisioned by the Founders, both in terms of impact, chronology
and likelihood, was subversion by force of arms. That is why the all-
important description of the ideal democratic commonwealth in the
First Amendment is immediately followed, in the Second and Third
Amendments, by two structural protections against subversion by
the military: the right to bear arms and the right to be free from
military quartering of troops.
The formal order of the Second Amendment contains the
only preamble in the Bill of Rights, a clause explaining the
importance of a "well regulated militia" to a free people, followed by
a substantive protection of the right to keep and bear arms.
Current readings of the Second Amendment ignore its formal
structure. One reading simply ignores the militia preamble,
focusing on the libertarian right to possess weapons. One reading
[Vol. 57:6:20072024
THE HOUSE WAS QUIET
privileges the preamble, subordinating the right to own a weapon to
the participation in a militia that no longer exists. The Supreme
Court's current reading borrows the worst of both, reading the
amendment to protect ownership of weapons that were once used in
the militia, but nothing else-the right to bear muskets.
A structural reading that seeks to give equal weight to both
clauses reveals a very different Second Amendment. The Founders
understood that the greatest threat to a democratic polity is the
emergence of an "unrepresentative" armed force isolated from of the
population it is designed to serve. By protecting the entire
population's "right to keep and bear arms" as participants in a "well
regulated," universal militia, the Founders hoped to prevent the
emergence of a dangerous imbalance between the organs of armed
coercion and the general population. 53 Recapturing the crucial
egalitarian role the Founders envisioned for the Second
Amendment as a prophylactic against the development of a
dangerous disconnect between the organs of armed coercion and
segments of the people is one of the benefits of reading the Bill of
Rights holistically.
The structural key to the Second Amendment is the
Founders' insight that the military poses a unique threat to
democratic governance whenever a marked imbalance emerges
between the makeup of the "people" and the makeup of the army.5 4
The organs of armed coercion known to the Founders were
profoundly threatening precisely because they were profoundly
unrepresentative. 55 Eighteenth century standing armies were often
53. Amar, The Second Amendment, supra note 32, at 892; see also David C. Williams,
Constitutional Tales of Violence: Populists, Outgroups, and the Multicultural Landscape of
the Second Amendment, 74 TUL. L. REV. 387, 469-72 (1999) ("[T]he Framers' Amendment
rested on the idea that the right to revolution inhered in the 'body of the people' - a
homogeneous, united citizenry that would rise up against a small set of tyrannical
usurpers."); Stuart Banner, The Second Amendment, So Far, 117 HARv. L. REV. 898, 910
(2004) (reviewing DAVID C. WILLIAMS, THE MYTHIC MEANINGS OF THE SECOND AMENDMENT:
TAMING POLITICAL VIOLENCE IN A CONSTITUTIONAL REPUBLIC (2003). ("[T]he point of the
Second Amendment is ... to ensure that the Body of the People retains the capacity to rise up
and overthrow an oppressive government.").
54. Concern with the unrepresentative nature of the organs of armed coercion was a
staple of republican thought. E.g., J.G.A. Pocock, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT 416 (1975);
John Trenchard & Thomas Gordon, Cato's Letters No. 94, reprinted in THE ENGLISH
LIBERTARIAN HERITAGE 222-23 (David L. Jacobson ed., 1965).
55. George Mason captured the ethos of his age when he warned that "[wihere once a
standing army is established in any country, the people lose their rights." George Mason,
Address at the Virginia Constitutional Convention (June 14, 1788), reprinted in NEIL H.
COGAN, THE COMPLETE BILL OF RIGHTS 192 (1997). Elbridge Gerry explicitly stated during
Congress's discussion of the Second Amendment: "What, sir, is the use of a militia? It is to
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made up of mercenaries with no ties whatever to the polity. 56 Even
when drawn from the indigenous population, the eighteenth
century military was a caste apart.57 Moreover, law enforcement in
the eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries was often a private
responsibility, leading to widespread self-help and to the
persistence of private armed bands. 58 Finally, "select" militias
drawn from an unrepresentative slice of the community posed a
real threat of armed faction.
Faced with such unrepresentative institutions of armed
coercion, the Founders turned in the Second Amendment to the
idea of a universal "well regulated" citizens' militia as the ultimate
democratic deterrent to armed oppression. 59 Madison said it most
clearly in Federalist No. 46:
[i]f a standing army were used to oppress the people]... [tlo these would be opposed a
militia amounting to near half a million citizens with arms in their hands, officered
by men chosen from among themselves, fighting for their common liberties and
united and conducted by [state] governments possessing their affections and
confidence 60
To the Founders, the very idea of the militia was defined by
its inclusionary, representative nature, and by the exclusionary,
unrepresentative nature of the organs of armed coercion against
which it was to be deployed. 61 The antidote to armed subversion
provided by the Second Amendment was an assurance that the
ominous imbalance between the people and the wielders of armed
force would be bridged by a universal citizens' militia.
Of course, the universal citizens' militia imagined by the
Founders never existed. Even at its romantic peak, the citizens'
militia movement excluded blacks and women, to say nothing of
prevent the establishment of a standing army, the bane of liberty." ANNALS OF CONGRESS,
supra note 33, at 749-50.
56. DOUGLAS E. LEACH, ROOTS OF CONFLICT: BRITISH ARMED FORCES AND COLONIAL
AMERICANS, 1677-1763 4 (1986); Andrew Fletcher, A Discourse of Government with Relation
to Militias, in SELECTED POLITICAL WRITINGS AND SPEECHES 10 (David Daiches ed., 1979).
57. LAWRENCE D. CRESS, CITIZENS IN ARMS: THE ARMY AND THE MILITIA IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY TO THE WAR OF 1812 10 (1982).
58. Carol S. Steiker, Second Thoughts on First Principles, 107 HARV L. REV. 820, 830-38
(1994).
59. See David C. Williams, Civic Republicanism and the Citizen Militia: The Terrifying
Second Amendment, 101 YALE L. J. 551, 572 (1991) (discussing the Founders' preference for a
popular militia over a standing army because of the risk that an army would be usurped by
the executive).
60. THE FEDERALIST NO. 46, at 264 (James Madison), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST
AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS (E.H. Scott ed., 2002).
61. Id. at 577-79.
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religious dissenters and the poor. 62 Moreover, whatever vitality the
militia concept may have had in the Founders' time, it certainly did
not survive the nineteenth century. The Civil War destroyed
political support for the idea of autonomous state or local armies.
The rise of the "citizens' army" under Napoleon, and its tragic
perfection during the American Civil War, eliminated the spectre of
an alien and unrepresentative military standing apart from the
citizenry. Moreover, the establishment of democratically controlled
police forces in urban areas during the nineteenth century lessened
the risk from privately armed law enforcers.
The nineteenth century shift to at least nominally
representative institutions of armed coercion drained the idea of a
universal citizens' militia of its functional importance. Indeed, in a
real sense, the citizens' army and the democratic police force
became the universal citizens' militia in microcosm. Originally
conceived as a check on unrepresentative organs of coercion, the
militia's theoretical role atrophied when the very institutions of
coercion it was designed to check evolved into a citizens' army and a
professional, democratically accountable police force. 63  Since a
universal militia was no longer needed as a check on a
representative citizen's army and a police force that were scaled-
down versions of the militia itself, the very idea of a universal,
armed citizens' militia disintegrated, leaving the Second
Amendment entangled in its ruins.
Despite the demise of the militia concept, however, the
modern Second Amendment retains its importance as one of the
most important structural protections in the Bill of Rights. Read
structurally, it continues to provide a critical bulwark against the
emergence of a dangerous imbalance between armed forces and the
people. The disappearance of the universal citizens' militia was
premised on one critical assumption-the representative nature of
the newly evolved organs of armed coercion. But if, as has been the
case at every stage of our national existence, our organs of armed
coercion are not representative because segments of the population
62. Robert J. Cottrol & Raymond T. Diamond, The Second Amendment: Towards an
Afro-American Re-consideration, 80 GEO. L. J. 309, 323-27 (1991).
63. See LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, CRIME AND PUNISHMENT IN AMERICAN HISTORY 150-55
(1993) (examining the nineteenth century evolution of American law enforcement agencies in
becoming more militaristic and accountable to municipal and state governments); David H.
Bayley, Police: History, in 3 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF CRIME AND JUSTICE 1120, 1124-25 (Sanford H.
Kadish ed., 1983) (discussing the centralization and professionalization of American police
forces beginning in Boston in 1837); RAYMOND B. FOSDICK, AMERICAN POLICE SYSTEMS 58-
117 (1920) (analyzing the evolution of American systems of law enforcement from colonial
times to the early twentieth century).
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are systematically denied the right to serve, the ominous gap
between force and freedom re-emerges, at least for the excluded
groups. It is at this critical point that the "right to keep and bear
arms" in the modern Second Amendment plays its contemporary
role by enforcing the promise of universal access to service in the
contemporary citizens' militia-police and the military.
The Founders understood that a group systematically
excluded from the organs of armed coercion will inevitably be
treated as second-class citizens and will fall prey to private terror.
Nowhere is the wisdom of the Founders' understanding better
illustrated than by the tragic relationship between black Americans
and armed force. Initially enslaved by force of arms, black
Americans were not permitted to serve in the military until 1862.
Once the Civil War was won, they were excluded from the officer
corps. Even when allowed to serve, it was in segregated battalions,
consigned to second-class status. Black Americans were also
systematically excluded from the professional police forces that
emerged after the Civil War. At the same time, they were the
sustained targets of private, armed mobs like the Ku Klux Klan. It
was not until the desegregation of the armed forces by President
Truman in 1947 that legal barriers were removed to equal service
in the military. Equal access to police forces still remains difficult
to achieve.6 4
The surprising, deeply egalitarian structural protection of
the Second Amendment is that no group--not blacks, not women, 65
not gays 66 -can be excluded from "the right to keep and bear arms"
64. See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding examination for
police recruits that disproportionately excluded African Americans in absence of a showing of
intentional discrimination).
65. Women continue to be denied equal access to the armed forces. See generally
Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 78-83 (1981) (upholding exclusion of women from military
conscription). Much progress has, however, been made. See generally Frontiero v.
Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 678-79 (1973) (prohibiting different standards of spousal benefits
for male and female members of the armed services). Equal access to careers in law
enforcement remains difficult to achieve for women. See Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321,
335-36 & n.22 (1977) (holding that it is not a violation of Title VII for women to be denied
employment as prison guards where the jobs are deemed to be too dangerous for women).
66. Gays remain barred from the military and the police. Until they are present in
substantial numbers in the organs of armed coercion, history and the Second Amendment
warn that they will not achieve equal status in the society. Prior to 1981, although no formal
regulation forbade service by gays in the military, informal policies resulted in numerous
discharges. In Matlovich v. Secretary of the Air Force, 591 F.2d 852 (D.C. Cir. 1978), the
court ruled that a statement of reasons was required in connection with a decision to refuse
to permit a gay person to serve in the military. In response, the Defense Department
promulgated a series of Defense Directives requiring the discharge of gays. 46 Fed. Reg.
9571 (Jan. 29, 1981) (to be codified at 32 C.F.R. pt. 41). The flat ban on service in the
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as equal participants in our contemporary institutions of armed
coercion without risking the ominous imbalance between the
"people" and the wielders of armed force that the Founders
identified as the most serious threat to the First Amendment's ideal
commonwealth.
Unfortunately, the Second Amendment is currently mired in
a series of unsatisfactory readings that mask its egalitarian
underpinnings. One reading treats the amendment as a relic of pre-
Civil War federalism6 7 designed to protect autonomous state
militias against the regulatory powers granted to Congress in the
body of the Constitution.68 As a textual matter, the federalism
reading privileges the first clause of the amendment describing the
importance of a "well regulated militia," but it subordinates the
second clause assuring the "people" the "right to keep and bear
arms." Moreover, with the demise of a strong theory of states' rights
after the Civil War, the political idea of autonomous state armies
became all but obsolete. Thus, a federalism-driven Second
military by gays has been questioned by several courts. See Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160,
1167 (9th Cir. 1991) (recognizing the plaintiffs equal protection claim for discharge from the
Army because of her homosexuality and remanding the case); Falk v. Sec'y of the Army, 870
F.2d 941, 947 (2d Cir. 1989) (failing to uphold the constitutionality of a "regulation
discharging military personnel for their status as homosexuals"); Stefan v. Aspin, 8 F.3d 57,
70 (7th Cir. 1989) (holding that the Department of Defense Directives that compelled the
plaintiffs resignation because of his sexual orientation violated the equal protection
component of the Fifth Amendment's due process clause), rehearing en banc granted and
judgment vacated (1994); Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699, 712-716 (9th Cir.
1989) (Norris, J. concurring) (arguing that the army's regulations "directly burden the class
consisting of persons of homosexual orientation"); Matthews v. Marsh, 755 F.2d 182, 183-84
(1st Cir. 1985) (remanding for further consideration upon notice of additional evidence
proving homosexual conduct as opposed to merely homosexual intent). But see Ben-Shalom
v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 466 (7th Cir. 1989) (leaving the decision to the legislature and
allowing the Army to regulate as it pleased until regulated by the legislature). The 1981
regulations were superseded by so-called "Don't Ask - Don't Tell" regulations, permitting
gays to serve in the military if they do not reveal their sexual orientation. See Defense
Directive 1332.14 (Dec. 21, 1993).
67. JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 95, 227 n.76 (1980) (asserting that the
Second Amendment was clearly directed toward well-regulated militias of colonial times);
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 229 n.6 (2d ed. 1988); see also United
States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (interpreting the Second Amendment as protection
for the "preservation or efficiency of a well-regulated militia").
68. Article I, Section 8 provides:
The Congress shall have power . .. to provide for calling forth the Militia to
execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions: To
provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the Militia, and for governing
such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States,
reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of Officers, and the
Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by
Congress.
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8.
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Amendment does little more than provide extremely limited
autonomy to state National Guard units which, in any event,
remain subject to federalization at the President's option. 69 In
effect, the federalism reading consigns the Second Amendment to
historical irrelevance. 70
The alternative, individual rights reading of the Second
Amendment, views it as a broad guarantee of the personal right to
own firearms, an individual right that survives the demise of the
"well regulated" citizens' militia.71 A constitutionally protected right
to own firearms, argue individual rights readers, is necessary to
reinforce individual autonomy and to check governmental tyranny.
As a textual matter, the individual autonomy reading privileges the
second clause of the amendment protecting the "right to keep and
bear arms" at the expense of the amendment's "well regulated
militia" preamble and fails to explain how the uncontrolled
proliferation of privately owned firearms enhances the "security of a
free state."
The Supreme Court's highly tentative reading of the
amendment is an amalgam of the federalism and individual rights
positions.72  Accepting the federalism argument that the
amendment's principal purpose was the protection of state militias
against congressional incursion, the Court has confined the
protection of the amendment to the ownership of "arms" that might
have been useful for militia service. 73 Thus, the amendment does
69. See Roy G. Weatherup, Standing Armies and Armed Citizens: An Historical Analysis
of the Second Amendment, 2 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 961, 998 (1975) (citing Presser v. Illinois,
116 U.S. 252 (1886), for the idea that the Second Amendment merely protects members of
state militias, primarily from disarmament by the federal government).
70. Williams, supra note 59, at 596, 602.
71. See generally STEPHEN HALBROK, THAT EVERY MAN BE ARMED 84-87 (1984)
(arguing that the Second Amendment should be interpreted as a protection of individual
rights to bear arms); Don B. Kates, Handgun Prohibition and the Original Meaning of the
Second Amendment, 82 MICH. L. REV. 204 (1983) (same); Sanford Levinson, The
Embarrassing Second Amendment, 99 YALE L. J. 637 (1989) (same).
72. The Court has considered the Second Amendment on five occasions: Lewis v. United
States, 445 U.S. 55, 65 n. 8 (1980) (Second Amendment does not protect a convicted felon's
right to own a firearm); United States v. Miller, 307 U.S. 174, 178 (1939) (Second
Amendment does not apply to ownership of weapons not useful for militia service, such as
sawed off shotguns); Presser v. Illinois, 116 U.S. 252, 265 (1886) (refusing to apply Second
Amendment against the states during pre-incorporation times); Miller v. Texas, 153 U.S. 535,
538 (1894) (same); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 553 (1875) (establishing that
the Second Amendment does not protect against private violence). See also Dred Scott v.
Sandford, 60 U.S. 393, 450 (1857) (warning that if African-Americans were deemed "citizens"
they would have the right to keep and bear arms).
73. Miller, 307 U.S. at 178
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not protect ownership of sawed-off shotguns.7 4 But, apparently
accepting aspects of the individual rights position, the Court has
suggested that individual ownership of certain kinds of weapons
(hunting rifles, for example) may be protected, even after the
demise of the militia system. 75
Unfortunately, the Supreme Court's tentative approach
borrows the worst of both worlds. If the Second Amendment was
designed simply to preserve an autonomous state militia system
that did not outlive the Civil War, it is unclear why it should
provide any protection for private ownership of guns. On the other
hand, if its protections survive the demise of the state militia
system, it is unclear why the Second Amendment's protection
should be confined to the ownership of weapons that threaten
animals but pose no real check against the power of the modern
state. Where, for example, should a Court wedded to militia
usefulness theory place handguns (or antitank weapons) in its
hierarchy of weapons?
Thus, I fear that existing readings of the Second
Amendment protect too little, too much, or an arbitrary middle.
Read as a structural guaranty of equal access to service in the
police and the military, however, the Second Amendment can
recover the vibrancy and significance of its original role as one of
the most important provisions of the Bill of Rights. When the
Second Amendment protects the "right to keep and bear arms" in
the context of a "well regulated militia" designed to assure the
"security of a free state", the Second Amendment assures the
representative nature of the organs of armed coercion in a free
society. Thus, "the right to keep and bear arms" is not the right to
function as an autonomous armed island, but the right to
participate equally in the common defense of the community
through equal access to service in representative institutions of
armed coercion.
Failure to permit otherwise qualified gays to serve in the
military and the police violates the Second Amendment. Failure to
include otherwise qualified women in the military draft and in
combat positions violates the Second Amendment. Any rule that
excludes a qualified segment of the citizenry from equal service in
the armed organs of coercion creates precisely the ominous
74. Id.
75. Id. at 182 (recognizing that different states established varying degrees of protection
of individual rights to bear arms).
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imbalance between force and freedom that the Second Amendment
is designed to prevent.76
The Third Amendment, banning the quartering of troops in
peacetime and requiring Congressional assent in wartime, is quite
obviously designed to protect civilians from military occupation.
One of the most fortunate aspects of our history has been the lack of
a need to explore modern analogues of the Third Amendment's
structural protection against military control of civilian society. 77
3. The Fourth Through Eighth Amendments: Regulating Law
Enforcement
With the threat of armed subversion dealt with by the
Second and Third Amendments, the Founders turned to the next
most serious set of perceived threats, abuse of the law enforcement
power. The twenty-three ideas in the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, Seventh,
and Eighth Amendments are a chronologically organized set of
structural protections against abuse of civilian law enforcement
authority keyed to the four classic law enforcement phases: (1)
investigation; (2) prosecution; (3) adjudication; and (4) punishment.
The Fourth Amendment regulates the investigatory phase,
placing it under judicial supervision and requiring probable cause
and precise warrants before a search, seizure, or arrest. The Fourth
Amendment, thus, continues the Founders' concern with abusive
use of armed force, this time at the hands of the civilian
authorities. 78
76. One objection to an equality reading of the Second Amendment is that it is
redundant of the protections of equality in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments. There
are, however, at least two powerful responses to such an objection. First, the Second
Amendment long predated the explicit introduction of equality into the Constitution. Second,
by providing a targeted protection for armed service, the Second Amendment should
strengthen the protection of equality, much as the establishment and speech clauses of the
First Amendment intensify protections that may also be analyzed as violations of equal
treatment. For example, if equal access to armed service is protected by the Second
Amendment as well as the Fifth, exclusionary techniques may be tested under an "effects"
standard, as opposed to the "intent" standard governing equal protection challenges. See
generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 239-245 (1976) (discussing the different
standards applicable under the Fifth Amendment for due process and under the Fourteenth
Amendment for equal protection).
77. Contrast the suspicion latent in the Third Amendment with our current willingness
to permit federal military personnel to vote in state and local elections. See Carrington v.
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965) (invalidating under the Fourteenth Amendment a Texas law
that kept servicemen from voting in the state).
78. For a comprehensive review of Fourth Amendment jurisprudence, see Akhil Reed
Amar, Fourth Amendment First Principles, 107 HARV. L. REV. 757 (1994). The civilian law
enforcement authorities contemplated by the Founders did not include large professional
police forces, which did not evolve until the middle of the nineteenth century. Instead,
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The Fifth Amendment kicks in once the investigation has
narrowed its focus to a particular target (typically after an arrest),
ushering in the prosecution phase. The Founders' continuing
concern with abusive use of force is reflected in the ban on self-
incrimination, which was widely seen as a structural protection
against torture. The Fifth Amendment also requires indictment by
a Grand Jury, forbids multiple prosecution for the same offense,
requires that government follow due process of law, and, finally,
limits the government's power to seize private property without a
public purpose and fair compensation.
The Sixth and Seventh Amendments govern the
adjudicatory phase, assuring jury trials in both criminal and civil
settings, as well as notice, venue, confrontation, compulsory
process, and counsel in criminal trials. The Eighth Amendment
provides protection during the punishment phase, banning
excessive fines, cruel and unusual punishments, and excessive bail.
Concern with the abusive use of force is at the core of the
Eighth Amendment. Thus, fears about abusive use of force underlie
the Second Amendment (abusive use of force by military), part of
the Fourth Amendment (abusive use of force by the police), part of
the Fifth Amendment (abusive use of force by the police and
prosecution), and the Eighth Amendment (abusive use of force by
courts and prisons).7 9
Thus, in strict chronological order, the law enforcement
provisions of the Bill of Rights limits the government in the
following ways:
(1) selecting a target for investigation (4th);
(2) investigating a target once selected (4th);
(3) restraining or searching a target once investigated (4th);
(4) interrogating a target once restrained (5th);
(5) charging a target once interrogated (5th);
(6) prosecuting a target once charged (5th);
(7) convicting a target once prosecuted (6th and 7th); and
(8) punishing a target once convicted (8th).
civilian law enforcement was the province of bounty hunters, individual officials, and/or ad
hoc bodies, often using temporary personnel provided by powerful private interests or drawn
from the local population.
79. Given such a careful effort to build constitutional bulwarks against abusive use of
force in virtually every imaginable setting, the Court's narrow reading of the Eighth
Amendment to deny protection against the abusive use of force in schools and mental
institutions is doubly unfortunate. See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 664-71 (1977)
(declining to extend Eighth Amendment protection to schoolchildren); id. at 683 (White, J.,
dissenting, joined by Brennan, J., Marshall, J., and Stevens, J.) (disagreeing with the
majority's narrow reading of the Eighth Amendment).
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No rights-bearing document in our tradition comes close to
such organizational precision. Once again, however, I know of no
modern case seeking to read the Fourth through the Eighth
Amendments as a coherent whole.
4. The Ninth and Tenth Amendments: Rules of Reading
Current readings of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments are
trapped at the extremes. According to a number of judges and
scholars, the judicially enforceable Bill of Rights ends with the
Eighth Amendment. They read the two closing amendments as
"truisms,"8 0 or "ink blots."81  Others read the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as climactic events empowering judges to protect
individual rights8 2 and develop a theory of federalism83 without
regard to the prior constitutional text.
Neither extreme reading is palatable. The minimalist
reading is openly disrespectful of the Constitution's text. The Ninth
and Tenth Amendments make up 20 percent of the Bill of Rights.
The ideas, indeed the texts, of each were demanded by the state
ratifying conventions,8 4 were an integral part of Madison's June 8th
80. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 123-24 (1941) (labeling the Tenth Amendment
a "truism"), overruling Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251 (1918). Cf. Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 560 (1985) (Powell, J., dissenting) (allowing
Congress to enforce minimum wage and overtime provisions on the states, while the dissent
argues that this ruling renders the Tenth Amendment meaningless).
81. Robert Bork analogized the Ninth Amendment to an ink blot. Nomination of Robert
H. Bork to be Associate Justice of the Supreme Court of the United States, Part I: Hearings
Before the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 100th Cong. 249 (1987) (analogizing the Ninth
Amendment to an ink blot because he thought it was difficult to interpret the amendment
outside of a specific context). In fairness, Bork's characterization was a metaphor for the
difficulty of finding substantive rights in the Amendment, a position I share.
82. For efforts to read the Ninth Amendment as an independent source of rights, see
Randy E. Barnett, Reconceiving the Ninth Amendment, 74 CORNELL. L. REV. 1 (1988),
reprinted in revised form in James Madison's Ninth Amendment, 1 THE RIGHTS RETAINED BY
THE PEOPLE 1 (Randy E. Barnett ed., 1989). See generally Norman Redlich, Are There
"Certain Rights ... Retained By the People"?, 37 N.Y.U. L. REV. 787 (1962) (outlining the
background against which the rights retained by the people from the Ninth and Tenth
amendments are judicially decided).
83. Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976), overruled by Garcia v. San
Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 579 (1985); id. at 579 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting);
id. at 582-85 (O'Connor, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell also
dissented in Garcia.
84. Versions of what became the Ninth and Tenth Amendments were demanded by
ratifying conventions in Massachusetts (February 6, 1788); South Carolina (May 23, 1788);
New Hampshire (June 21, 1788); Virginia (June 25, 1788); New York (July 26, 1788); and
North Carolina (Nov. 21, 1789). Each of the minority requests for amendments from
Delaware, Maryland, and Pennsylvania contained a request for a version of the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments. See COGAN, supra note 55, at 634-35, 674-75.
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proposals8 5 and were never questioned during the drafting and
ratifying process.8 6 It seems cavalier, especially for critics who claim
to hew most closely to the Founders' will, to ignore such a large and
intensely desired slice of their textual handiwork.
But the other extreme-using the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as free-standing sources of judicially enforceable
rights and powers-is also disrespectful of the text. Licensing
judges to pick and choose new personal rights with only the text of
the Ninth Amendment as an anchor is a positivist version of
natural law;8 7 reading the Tenth Amendment as a general
authorization to develop a nontextual, judicially enforceable theory
of federalism is a judicial blank check.
Reading the Ninth and Tenth Amendments structurally as
''second order" directions to future readers about how to read the
Constitution's text avoids both extremes.88 Read as canons of
constitutional construction, the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
neither merely take up space on the page, nor generate nontextual,
free standing norms. Rather, they provide a logical end point to the
text of the Bill of Rights by seeking to minimize the risks to the
ideal commonwealth posed by the Founders' reliance on words to
describe and preserve it.
85. See 1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 33, at 452 (articulating James Madison's
original version of the Ninth Amendment submitted to Congress on June 8).
86. Although the text of Madison's initial formulation was modified, the amendments
were never seriously questioned. For the debates concerning the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments, see COGAN, supra note 55, at 627-35, 642-43, 656, 663-74, 681-84, 698.
87. I have nothing against natural law. In authoritarian settings, natural law provides
an indispensable rallying point for adherents of human rights. Moreover, even in democratic
regimes, natural law provides valuable insights into the way people ought to behave. But,
given its essentially subjective content, I question its role as a measure of how people must
behave in a democracy. See Burt Neuborne, The Evolution of Rights, the Stork and the
Democratic Dilemma, in THE UNITED STATES CONSTITUTION: ROOTS, RIGHTS AND
RESPONSIBILITIES 145, 146 (A.E. Dick Howard ed., 1992) (exploring the origins of rights,
asserting that rights are not only "freestanding substantive phenomena" but are also "the
real-world consequences of a complex institutional interplay that acts to deflect error").
88. Reading the Ninth and Tenth Amendments as "second order" rules governing the
construction of the "first order" rules in the text finds support in Andrzej Rapaczynski, The
Ninth Amendment and the Unwritten Constitution: The Problems of Constitutional
Interpretation, 64 CHI-KENT L. REV. 177, 189 (1988) and in Lawrence G. Sager, You Can
Raise the First, Hide Behind the Fourth and Plead the Fifth. But What on Earth Can You Do
With the Ninth Amendment? 64 CHI-KENT L. REV. 239, 240-41 (1988). See also Thomas C.
Grey, The Uses of an Unwritten Constitution, 64 CHI-KENT L. REV. 211, 211-12 (1988)
(analyzing the structure and ramifications of a "judicially enforceable unwritten constitution"
that is based on "certain constitutional customs and practices, and their associated values
and ideals"). See generally JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 34-41 (1980)
(outlining different approaches used to interpret the Ninth Amendment).
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Heirs to several hundred years of English hermeneutic
tradition,8 9 the Founders understood that their attempt to harness
the power of words in the service of freedom could backfire in at
least three ways. First, they feared that an incomplete or
inadequate textual description of individual rights might result in a
premature freezing of the concept. 90 Madison explicitly alluded to
this concern in his June 8th speech introducing the Bill of Rights:
It has been objected also against a Bill of Rights, that, by enumerating particular
exceptions to the grant of power, it would disparage those rights which were not
placed in that enumeration; and it might follow by implication, that those rights
which were not singled out, were intended to be assigned into the hands of the
General Government, and were consequently insecure. This is one of the most
plausible arguments I have ever heard urged against the admission of a bill of rights
into this system; but I conceive, that it may be guarded against. 9 1
Second, the Founders feared that the power of government
might be inadvertently enhanced by a construction of the text that
implied the existence of powers from the enumeration of rights.92
89. For a comprehensive survey of the Founders' hermeneutical tradition, see H.
Jefferson Powell, The Original Understanding of Original Intent, 98 HARv. L. REV. 885, 888-
902 (1985), reprinted in INTERPRETING THE CONSTITUTION 53-61 (Jack Rakove ed., 1990).
See also DAVID LIEBERMAN, THE PROVINCE OF LEGISLATION DETERMINED (1989) (advancing a
reinterpretation of eighteenth century attitudes to social change and law reform).
90. The clearest expression of Madison's concern with the risk of underinclusion is in
THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 194, 198 (James Madison), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST AND
OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS (E.H. Scott ed., 2002) (inadequacy of words to convey
complex ideas). See also Letter from James Madison to Thomas Jefferson (Oct. 17, 1788), in
5 WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 271-272 (Gaillard Hunt ed., 1904):
[T]here is great reason to fear that a positive declaration of some of the most
essential rights could not be obtained in the requisite latitude. I am sure that the
rights of conscience in particular, if submitted to public definition would be
narrowed much more than they are likely to be by an assumed power....
For an expression of similar concern by Thomas Jefferson, see 3 WORKS OF THOMAS
JEFFERSON 4, 13, 101 (P. Ford ed., 1892-1899).
91. It is at this point in his speech that Madison describes his initial version of the
Ninth Amendment that provided:
The exceptions here or elsewhere in the Constitution made in favor of
particular rights, shall not be construed as to diminish the just importance of
other rights retained by the people, or as to enlarge the powers delegated by the
Constitution; but either as actual limitations of such powers, or as inserted merely
for greater caution.
1 ANNALS OF CONGRESS, supra note 33, at 452.
92. The clearest expression of Hamilton's concern with the negative pregnant latent in a
Bill of Rights is THE FEDERALIST NO. 84, at 469-70 (Alexander Hamilton), reprinted in THE
FEDERALIST AND OTHER CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS (E.H. Scott ed., 2002); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 44, at 250-52 (James Madison), reprinted in THE FEDERALIST AND OTHER
CONSTITUTIONAL PAPERS (E.H. Scott ed., 2002) (analyzing the adoption of the "necessary and
proper" clause and the ramifications of enumerating all powers in the Constitution).
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James Wilson put the issue most clearly in the Pennsylvania
Ratifying Convention:
[I]n a government consisting of enumerated powers, such as is proposed for the
United States, a bill of rights would not only be unnecessary, but in my humble
judgment, highly imprudent. In all societies, there are many powers and rights that
cannot be particularly enumerated. A bill of rights annexed to a constitution is an
enumeration of the powers reserved. If we attempt enumeration, everything that is
not enumerated, is presumed to be given. The consequence is that an imperfect
enumeration would throw all implied power into the scale of the government, and
the rights of the people would be rendered incomplete.
9 3
Third, they feared that incremental erosion of the power of
the states might occur through reading the text of the Constitution
as granting implied national powers. 94
The Founders' first two semantic concerns--fear of an
inadequate or incomplete description of rights and fear that
enumerating rights might imply residual governmental
powers-reflected the Founders' fears about how the text of the Bill
of Rights would be read. The third concern dealt, not with reading
the Bill of Rights, but with possible expansive readings of the body
of the Constitution. All three concerns were driven, however, by a
sophisticated understanding of an enduring uncertainty at the core
the English hermeneutic tradition.
By the end of Henry VIII's reign, English lawyers were
engaged in a debate about how to read the directives flowing in an
increasing stream from parliament. 95 The debate pitted literalists
93. JONATHAN ELLIOT, 2 DEBATES OF THE STATE CONSTITUTIONS ON THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 436 (2d ed. 1836). John Ely has criticized Wilson's conflation of rights and
powers as a "category mistake." ELY, supra note 88, at 35-36.
94. As the dispute between Hamilton and Jefferson over the constitutionality of
Congress's effort to create a national bank in 1791 reveals, fears over implied national
powers must be distinguished from arguments about how to read the "necessary and proper"
clause. Compare Alexander Hamilton, Final Version of an Opinion on the Constitutionality of
an Act to Establish a Bank, 8 THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER HAMILTON 97, 101-08 (Harold C.
Syrett ed., 1965) (arguing that a fair reading of the "necessary and proper clause" permits
some activities not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution and arguing for a much broader
reading of the word "necessary" than Jefferson, rendering the Tenth Amendment irrelevant),
with Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a National Bank (1791), reprinted
in THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 284 (P. Ford ed., 1892-99) (failing to make the
distinction and arguing that the Tenth Amendment forbids any national activity not
expressly mentioned in the Constitution). Hamilton argues that a fair reading of the
"necessary and proper clause" permits some activities not mentioned explicitly, rendering the
Tenth Amendment inapplicable.
95. For the earliest known English work on the interpretation of statutes, dating from
the late sixteenth century, see SAMUEL E. THORNE, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE DISCOURSE ON
THE MEANING AND INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES (Huntington Library 1942). See generally
SIR CHRISTOPHER HATTON, A TREATISE CONCERNING STATUTES OR ACTS OF PARLIAMENT: AND
THE EXPOSITION THEREOF (1677) (defining Acts of Parliament and divisions of statutes and
discussing different interpretation methods of statutes). Since Sir Christopher Hatton died
VANDERBIL T LAW REVIEW [Vol. 57:6:2007
armed with the canon inclusio unius est exclusio alterius96 against
the liberal construction crowd armed with the tradition of "equity of
the statute."9 7 Unlike inclusio unius, which hews strictly to literal
text, equity of the statute invites a judicial reader to extend literal
text to cover closely analogous settings. 98 As Lord Coke, the
preeminent lawyer of his age noted, in 1628:
[T]he equitie is a construction made by the Judges that cases out of the letter of a
statute yet being within the same mischief or cause of the making of the same, shall
be within the same remedy that the statute provideth; and the reason thereof is, for
that the law-makers could not possibly set down all cases in express terms.
9 9
Eighteenth century American legal culture recognized both
hermeneutic traditions as legitimate, unpredictably applying one or
the other in different contexts, much as we veer wildly today
between literal and equitable readings of legal texts. 100
in 1591, Professor Thorne suggests that the publisher of the Hatton treatise "modernized" it
prior to publication. For the treatment of earlier statutes, see THEODORE F.T. PLUCKNETT,
STATUTES AND THEIR INTERPRETATION IN THE FIRST HALF OF THE FOURTEENTH CENTURY
(R.H. Helmholz et al. eds., William S. Hein & Co. reprint 1980).
96. For cases applying inclusio unius to statutes in derogation of the common law, see
Ash v. Abdy, 36 Eng. Rep. 1014 (Ch. 1678) and Brown v. Barry, 3 U.S. 365, 367 (1797)
(deciding that the intention of the legislature prevails despite "any rule of construction
declared by previous acts to the contrary").
97. The concept of the equity of the statute is traceable to ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN
ETHICS 174-75 (Christopher Rowe transl., 2002). Equity of the statute is discussed in
THORNE, supra note 95, at 140-154; HATTON, supra note 95, at 44-53 (discussing the equity of
the statute and applying the equity interpretation to specific statutes of the time); 1 WILLIAM
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *61. Heydon's Case, 76 Eng. Rep. 637 (Ex. 1584); is generally
viewed as a principal judicial articulation of the doctrine.
98. See generally W. H. Loyd, The Equity of a Statute, 58 U. PA. L. REV. 76 (1909-10)
(discussing the equity of the statute); James McCauley Landis, Statutes and the Sources of
Law, HARVARD LEGAL ESSAYS (1934), reprinted in 2 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 7 (1964-65) (same);
Frederick J. deSloovere, The Equity and Reason of a Statute, 21 CORNELL L.Q. 591, 591-604
(1935-36); S.E. Thorne, The Equity of a Statute and Heydon's Case, 31 Ill. L. Rev. 202 (1936);
Roscoe Pound, Common Law and Legislation, 21 HARv. L. REV. 383 (1908) (recognizing a
growing respect for legislation, as opposed to the historical deference to common law). The
best modern treatment is in John F. Manning, Textualism and Equity of the Statute, 101
Colum. L. Rev. 1 (2001).
99. SIR EDWARD COKE, COKE ON LITTLETON (1628); Co. Litt. Lib. I, Ch. II, sec. 21, fol.
24b, quoting Bracton's definition. Plowden discusses the equity of the statute in his report of
Eyston v. Studd, 15 Eng. Rep. 688, 698 (C.B. 1573): "So that when the words of a statute
enact one thing, they enact all other things which are in the like degree."
100. For applications of equity of the statute in the United States, see United States v.
Freeman, 44 U.S. 556, 565 (1845); Simonton v. Barrell, 21 Wend. 362, 365 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1839); Hoguet v. Wallace, 28 N.J.L. 523, 525.27 (N.J. 1860); White v. Carpenter, 2 Paige 217,
229 (N.Y. Ch. 1830); Hersha v. Brenneman, 6 Serg. & Rawle 2, 4 (Pa. 1820). The cases are
drawn from LANDIS, supra note 98, at 11, 28 n.12. The history of equity of the statute in the
United States is discussed in FRANCIS LIEBER, LEGAL AND POLITICAL HERMENEUTICS, 283-89
(William G. Hammond ed., 3d ed. 1880) and in BLACK, HANDBOOK ON THE CONSTRUCTION
AND INTERPRETATION OF LAWS, 42 (1896). Statutes in derogation of the common law were
quickly removed from equity of the statute in favor of literal construction. Brown v. Barry, 3
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It was, I believe, the Founders' understandable inability to
predict with confidence which hermeneutic tradition-inclusio
unius or equity of the statute-would influence the reading of what
constitutional text that was the moving force behind the Ninth and
Tenth Amendments.
As I have noted, Madison and Hamilton each feared that
inclusio unius might be incorrectly applied to the text of the Bill of
Rights to freeze the catalogue of rights prematurely and to imply a
grant of power up to the limits of each express right. Similarly,
Jefferson feared that equity of the statute might be incorrectly
applied to the body of the Constitution to increase the power of the
national government through the engine of implied powers.
The Ninth Amendment deals with the Madison's fear by
instructing, or at least authorizing, future readers to apply the
flexible construction techniques associated with equity of the
statute when reading the Bill of Rights. 101 Unlike the effort to read
U.S. 365 (1797). But equity of the statute survived in other statutory settings well into the
nineteenth century. Indeed, under other rubrics, its spirit survives today. In Great Britain,
the flexible approach to text that characterizes equity of the statute gradually gave way to a
belief that parliamentary supremacy required rigid adherence to the literal text. See Jones v.
Smart, 1 T.R. 44, 52 (Eng. 1785) ("[A] cause omissus," observed Buller, J., "can in no case be
supplied by a court of law, for that would be to make laws."). Dean Landis has suggested
that the eagerness of British judges to surrender the "equitable" power to expand statutes
flowed from a lack of sympathy with the British parliamentary reform movement. LANDIS,
supra 98, at 8-12. He noted that equity of the statute retained vitality in the United States
until a similar judicial reaction against Jacksonian reform. Id. It is a paradox of statutory
construction that the greater the ostensible judicial fidelity to legislative supremacy, the
harder it may be for the legislature to effect broad changes in the status quo. When judges
insist they must defer to the literal text, they shift an insuperable linguistic burden to the
legislature. Given the limitations of language, legislators need judges as full partners in the
reformative enterprise if their joint handiwork is to effect significant change in the status
quo. Union organizers - and conservative judges - have long known that the best way to
subvert a text is a rule book slowdown.
101. The Supreme Court has not developed a consistent institutional reading of the
Ninth Amendment. Prior to Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), the amendment's
existence had scarcely been judicially acknowledged. Douglas's opinion for the Court
recognized "penumbras" formed by "emanations" from the text. Id. at 484. While Justice
Douglas's reading of the Ninth Amendment in Griswold is consistent with treating it as a
canon of construction, he is vague about precisely how the canon works. See Lubin v. Panish,
415 U.S. 409, 722 (1974) (referring to the right to vote as a right retained by the people in the
Ninth Amendment or as a penumbra of the First Amendment); Doe v. Bolton, 410 U.S. 179,
210 (1972) (arguing that though the Ninth Amendment does not create "federally enforceable
rights," it protects those retained rights that fall "within the sweep of the 'the Blessings of
Liberty' mentioned in the Preamble to the Constitution"); Palmer v. Thompson, 403 U.S. 217,
231 (1970) (discussing that if some activity falls within the "penumbra of the policies of the
Thirteenth, Fourteenth or Fifteenth Amendments," then it should also "be in the category of
those enumerated rights protected by the Ninth Amendment"); Lewis v. United States, 385
U.S. 206, 206-07 (1966) (concluding that no violation of the Fourth Amendment occurred
when an undercover agent was invited to the plaintiff's home to participate in a drug deal,
the deal was consummated, and the narcotics confiscated and later used in a criminal trial
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the Ninth Amendment as a free standing source of rights, reading it
as an authorization to use equity of the statute forces a judicial
reader to cleave closely to the constitutional text. Equity of the
statute takes as its point of departure a careful study of the text to
determine its structure, underlying purpose, and animating
principle. Applying Ninth Amendment equity of the statute to the
Bill of Rights, a "nonliteral" personal right may be judicially
recognized only if it is fairly derived from the constitutional text
pursuant to one (or perhaps all) of three traditional equitable
construction techniques:
(1) the nonliteral personal right must fit comfortably within
the text;
(2) it must be necessary to the full enjoyment of a textual
guarantee; and/or
(3) it must be so analogous to a literal right that it would be
arbitrary to enforce one and not the other.
Justice Harlan's addition of a seventh, nontextual right-
freedom of association-to the First Amendment's six textual ideas
is a classic example of Ninth Amendment equity of the statute in
action.102 If the First Amendment were read strictly in accordance
with inclusio unius, the textual protection of "assembly" but not
"association" would argue against Justice Harlan's pathbreaking
decision in NAACP v. Alabama. But the Ninth Amendment freed
Justice Harlan from the constraints of inclusio unius and
challenged him to read the First Amendment against the
background of the equity of the statute. As an exercise in applying
the equity of the statute, interpolating freedom of association into
the First Amendment is a walk in the park, meeting all three
against the plaintiff). Justice Goldberg's celebrated separate opinion in Griswold, 381 U.S. at
486-99, joined by Chief Justice Warren and Justice Brennan, argued that the Ninth
Amendment authorized judicial recognition of a right of marital privacy. While Justice
Goldberg's analysis fails to distinguish precisely between reading the Ninth Amendment as a
source of substantive rights or as a canon of construction, his opinion is more consistent with
a substantive rights reading. Other Justices have also interpreted the Ninth Amendment.
Hodson v. Minn., 497 U.S. 417, 447 (1990) (Stevens, J.); Mass. v. Upton, 466 U.S. 727, 737
(1984) (Stevens, J.); Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Va., 448 U.S. 555, 579 (1980) (Burger, J.);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153 (1973) (Blackmun, J.). Chief Justice Burger's use of the
Ninth Amendment in Richmond Newspapers comes very close to the technique urged in this
Article. See Laurence H. Tribe, Contrasting Constitutional Visions: Of Real and Unreal
Differences, 22 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 95, 102 (1987) (underscoring the importance of the
Ninth Amendment in enabling the court to expand protection of liberties under the
Fourteenth Amendment for an entire line of right-to-privacy cases).
102. NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 437
(1963).
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criteria for Ninth Amendment equity of the statute. As a textual
matter, association fits neatly between press and assembly, filling
out the idea of collective action. Association is, moreover, necessary
to the full enjoyment of several textually guaranteed First
Amendment rights such as speech and assembly. Finally,
association is so closely analogous to textually described First
Amendment rights that it would be arbitrary to protect one but not
the other. Thus, when Justice Harlan used analogy and inference to
insert a seventh idea-association--into the First Amendment, he
was true to the ethos of the Ninth Amendment and the deep
structure of the First.
Reading the Ninth Amendment as an authorization to use
equity of the statute gives the amendment real bite.103 It permits
judicial readers to "perfect"104 the text of the Bill of Rights
(especially the First Amendment) by filling interstices, implying
necessary adjuncts, and analogizing. Of course, the decision
whether to exercise the Ninth Amendment power to interpolate,
imply, and analogize will often be a controversial one, provoking
intense disagreement over its wisdom and propriety'0 5 Being
empowered by the Ninth Amendment to eschew literalism and
inclusio unius thinking does not mean that it is always proper to do
so. Thus, recognizing the Ninth Amendment's role as a permissible
canon of construction is only the first step to developing a judicial
philosophy about when to invoke it. Disagreement over whether a
power is being wisely exercised is, however, a far cry from a claim
that the power does not exist at all.
103. In addition to the First Amendment applications discussed supra and infra in text
accompanying notes 102-105, equity of the statute can help explain the recognition in Bolling
v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954), of a nontextual equality right in the Fifth Amendment
and clarify whether the prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment in the Eighth
Amendment should be extended from prisons to schools, mental hospitals, and the military.
See Ingraham v. Wright, 430 U.S. 651, 671 (1977) (holding that the Eighth Amendment was
meant to apply to criminal procedures and is not applicable to corporal punishment in
schools). Equity of the statute does not, however, help untangle the "incorporation"
controversy or tell us whether the Eighth Amendment bars the death penalty. Those issues
deal, not with the application of analogy, inference, or implication to existing text, but with
the related task of giving precise meaning to ambiguous text.
104. The citation is intended to honor, but disagree with, Henry Monaghan's Our Perfect
Constitution, 56 N.Y.U.L. REV. 353, 396 (1981).
105. Despite invitations, the Supreme Court has, thus far, declined to analyze education
as a First Amendment right. San Antonio Ind. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 36
(1971) (addressing appellee's contention that education is a fundamental right because it is
essential to the effective exercise of First Amendment freedoms, the Court held, "[W]e have
never presumed to possess either the ability or the authority to guarantee to the citizenry the
most effective speech ...").
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Conversely, the Tenth Amendment deals with Jefferson's
fear that future readers would use analogy and inference to expand
the power of the national government at the expense of the states.
Where questions of national power are at stake, the Tenth
Amendment forbids the use of implication and analogy,
commanding the use of inclusio unius to avoid undue accretions of
central authority.106 Unlike the effort to read the Tenth
Amendment as a source of substantive federalism rights, reading it
as a constitutional canon of construction does not invite a judge to
develop a nontextual theory of federalism. It focuses judicial
attention, instead, on the critical question of whether the best
reading of an enumerated power actually authorizes the challenged
federal action or whether the case involves an effort to expand
beyond enumerated powers by the use of implication and
analogy. 10 7 For example, rather than asking whether the Tenth
Amendment substantively trumps a virtually unlimited conception
of the commerce power, 08 reading the Tenth Amendment as a
canon of construction would force a court to ask whether the best
reading of the Commerce Clause actually authorized the
government regulation or whether the Commerce Clause was being
used as a springboard for an implied national power to do more
than regulate commerce. 10 9 Such an exercise might cast doubt on
the current practice of permitting a Rube Goldberg-like de minimis
106. See infra Part V.A. for a discussion of narrow construction techniques mandated by
the Tenth Amendment.
107. Codifying inclusio unius should not be confused with a general command to read
enumerated powers narrowly, any more than equity of the statute requires a broad reading
of personal rights. The celebrated disagreement in 1791 between Hamilton and Jefferson
over the constitutionality of the Bank of the United States illustrates the point. See supra
note 94. Hamilton argued that the power to charter a national bank was contained in a fair
reading of both the commerce clause and the necessary and proper clause. Id. Jefferson
disagreed, arguing that the Tenth Amendment forbade the exercise of any national power not
explicitly mentioned in the Constitution's text. Id. In my opinion, Jefferson's position begs
the central question of whether the power to create the Bank was, in fact, granted by a fair
reading of either or both of the commerce and the necessary and proper clauses. Jefferson's
reading of the Tenth Amendment would not only forbid implied powers, but also require an
extremely narrow reading of enumerated powers. Id. Thus, I believe that Hamilton has the
better of the argument, at least as it implicates the Tenth Amendment. Reasonable people
can disagree on the merits with Hamilton's expansive reading of the necessary and proper
clause, but not because it violates the Tenth Amendment.
108. See Nat'l League of Cities v. Usery, 426 U.S. 833, 842 (1976) (recognizing that under
the Tenth Amendment, Congress cannot use the commerce clause in a fashion that interferes
with the "States' integrity or their ability to function effectively in a federal system.").
109. Justice Harlan suggested such an approach in his decision in Maryland v. Wirtz, 392
U.S. 183, 198 (1968).
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impact on interstate commerce to justify virtually unlimited
intrusions into a state's reserved police powers. 110
There are several troublesome textual placements. If the
First Amendment is rigorously organized on an "inside out" axis,
with rights flowing from the core of the human spirit outwards to
formal political interaction with the State, shouldn't free exercise
come before establishment? Which is a greater intrusion into the
interior realm of spirit: refusing to permit worship or requiring
involuntary support of someone else's worship?
In fact, in Madison's original June 8th formulation,
protection of worship preceded establishment."' Establishment is
placed before free exercise for the first time in the July 28th draft of
the Committee of Eleven." 2 On balance, though, it seems
right-certainly defensible-to treat establishment as the greater
intrusion. George Orwell tells us that a state-compelled affirmative
act of betrayal is vastly destructive of the human spirit, even more
destructive than a prohibition. 13 The Founders apparently thought
so, too.
A more troublesome placement is the Takings Clause at the
close of the Fifth Amendment. If the Fifth Amendment is about
control of the power to initiate formal proceedings, why does it close
with a protection against the unfair taking of private property?
And, what is a clause protecting private property against unfair
taking by the government doing in the same amendment as the
privilege against self-incrimination, the privilege against double
jeopardy, and the right to a grand jury indictment? The answer lies,
I believe, in the relation of the Takings Clause to the immediately
preceding Due Process Clause.
The first three clauses of the Fifth Amendment--grand jury,
double jeopardy, and self-incrimination--protect against the state's
power to initiate formal criminal proceedings. The last two
110. See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 567-68 (1995) (holding de minimis impact
of school gun violence on interstate commerce does not justify congressional imposition of
Gun Free School Zones Act under commerce clause power).
111. Madison's original June 8 version provided: "The civil rights of none shall be
abridged on account of religious belief or worship, nor shall any national religion be
established, nor shall the full and equal rights of conscience be in any manner, or on any
pretext, infringed." BERNARD SCHWARTZ, 5 THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS 1026 (1980).
112. The August 15 version of the Committee of Eleven provided: "No religion shall be
established by law, nor shall the equal rights of conscience be infringed." Id. at 1088.
113. See generally GEORGE ORWELL, 1984. It is, I suggest, no coincidence that the most
lyrical defense of the First Amendment in our literature was evoked by an attempt to compel
a betrayal of religious conscience by schoolchildren. W. Va. Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S.




clauses--Due Process and Takings-prevent the state from acting
summarily, either by depriving a target of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law or by seizing a target's private property
for an improper purpose or at an unfair price. Thus, at the moment
the state has completed its investigation and decided on initiating
coercive action against a particular target, either criminal or civil,
the Due Process and Takings Clauses are logically placed to assure
that state power cannot be used to short-circuit the important
protections provided in connection with adjudication and
punishment. The Fifth Amendment closes, therefore, with a
thoughtful effort to prevent government from avoiding the
adjudicatory protections provided in the Sixth and Seventh
Amendments, at exactly the point when the temptation to do so
would be greatest.
Finally, why is the excessive bail clause placed in the Eighth
Amendment dealing with punishment? One answer is that
excessive bail is a form of summary punishment, imposing
incarceration without trial. Another is that the ban on excessive
bail had been linked historically with the ban on excessive fines in
an attempt to control the financial aspect of the criminal process. 114
Rather than sever the two, the bail clause was simply linked to the
fine clause in the punishment Amendment-not elegant, but
defensible.
114. A similar formulation was contained in the preexisting constitutions of at least six
states. BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT RIGHTS OF MANKIND 90 (Madison House ed., 1992).
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If I am right, the deep structure of the Bill of Rights looks
like this, with candidates for equity of the statute protection listed
in brackets:11 5
1. Description of the Ideal Commonwealth:
Internal dignity:
religious conscience: no establishment of religion








[access to mass media]
Collective behavior:
assembly
[association: political, social, intimate]
Political action:




[funding the democratic process]
2. Defense of the Ideal Commonwealth Against Military Threat:
equal right to participate in modern organs of armed coercion
no quartering of troops in peacetime
3. Defense of Ideal Commonwealth Against Law Enforcement
Threat:
Abuse of Power to Investigate:
prior judicial control over search, seizure, arrest
specificity of warrants
115. For another effort at setting forth the Bill of Rights in schematic form, see
Christopher Wolfe, The Original Meaning of the Due Process Clause, in THE BILL OF RIGHTS:
ORIGINAL MEANING AND CURRENT UNDERSTANDING 218 (Hickock ed., 1991).
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paid counsel in criminal cases
[appointed counsel in criminal cases]
civil juries
[appointed counsel in civil proceedings]
Abuse of the Power to Punish
excessive bail
excessive fines






equity of statute authorized
involving national government powers:
inclusio unius compelled
IV. IS THE STRUCTURE OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS THE RESULT OF
CONSCIOUS THOUGHT?
Skeptics may legitimately object at this point that the
structure suggested in Part III is so obvious that it was inevitable
or, alternatively, that it was merely a random event. Either the
structure imposed itself, or monkeys on a typewriter produced it. In
neither case should the structure be taken as an act of will by the
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Founders. 116 But the skeptics would be wrong. A study of the
antecedents of the Bill of Rights and the contemporaneous textual
sources make clear that the disciplined structure of the Bill of
Rights was not inevitable and certainly did not happen by
chance.117
The textual history of the Bill of Rights taps four sources: (1)
English documents, (2) Colonial charters, (3) Revolutionary
declarations, and (4) Contemporaneous formulations. None share
the structure of the Bill of Rights.""
A. The English Documentary Sources
Conventional historical analysis cites four English
documents as primary antecedents of the Bill of Rights: the Magna
Carta; the English Petition of Right (1628); Cromwell's Agreement
of the People (1649) and the English Bill of Rights (1689).
English rights-bearing documents are said to begin in 1215
with the Magna Carta. The numerous substantive and procedural
rights set forth in the Magna Carta do not appear to have anything
116. Even if the structure were random, it would provide an elegant and principled
method of interpreting the Bill of Rights. Even an unintentional structure is helpful in
giving the best reading to text. When, however, the structure is intentional, its power as an
interpretive guide is magnified.
117. Most of the documents discussed in this section are assembled in chronological order
in Bernard Schwartz's multivolume compilation THE ROOTS OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS. The
House debates (there is no record of the Senate debates) leading up to the adoption of the Bill
of Rights are chronicled in 5 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 1050-1140. See also COGAN,
supra note 55; THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner, eds. 1987).
In preparing this Article, I used the multivolume Schwartz compilation because it reproduces
the relevant texts in chronological order. Cogan's extremely useful compilation is
particularly valuable in tracing the chronological evolution of a particular clause. There is, of
course, a vast historical literature on the intellectual origins of the Constitution and Bill of
Rights. Among the leading works are BERNARD BAIYLYN, THE IDEOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF THE
AMERICAN REVOLUTION (2d. ed. 1992) and J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT
(1975).
118. I confess to a certain cavalier approach to the texts that follow. I attempted to
isolate the provisions that ultimately find their way into the Bill of Rights, ignoring the often
revolutionary ideas that led to the body of the Constitution. The result of such an approach
is to drain the historical documents of much of their coherence and intellectual importance.
Such a process appeared necessary, however, in order to test for the antecedents of the
organizational structure of the Bill of Rights.
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in common with the final structure of the Bill of Rights,"19 except
that rights of religious conscience are listed first. 120
The English Petition of Right (1628), often cited as an
antecedent to the Bill of Rights, contains several ideas that
ultimately find their way into the document, but in no semblance of
their final order: 121
(1) no deprivation of liberty or property without judgment of
peers or due process of law - (5th, 6th, and 7th)
(2) no quartering of troops - (3rd);
(3) limits on martial law - (2nd, 3rd, and 5th.)
Cromwell's Agreement of the People (1649), also contains
several ideas that eventually appear in the Bill of Rights but
without anticipating its organizational structure:
(1) limits on military draft - (2nd)
(2) respect for common right and private property - (5th)
(3) limited rights of religious conscience - (1st)
The most elaborate of the English antecedent documents
was the English Bill of Rights (1689). Once again, while the
document contains a number of important ideas that reappear in
the Bill of Rights, the organizational structure does not closely
prefigure the later document, although the beginnings of a
structure are present:
(1) right of petition - (1st);
(2) no standing army in peacetime - (2nd and 3rd);
(3) Protestants alone may bear arms for defense -(2nd);
(4) no excessive bail, excessive fines, or cruel and unusual
punishments - (8th);
(5) jurors properly empanelled - (6th and 7th);
(6) no fines without conviction - 5th
119. I do not assert that the Magna Carta lacks an organizing principle. A better
understanding of its historical context might well reveal a disciplined structure. For my
purposes, I need merely assert that the organizational structure of the Magna Carta does not
prefigure the structure of the Bill of Rights.
120. The ideas that eventually find expression in the Bill of Rights are noted in Table A
of the Appendix, infra.
121. In the material that follows, I identify the ultimate placement in the Bill of Rights
in parenthesis immediately after a paraphrase of the English documentary provision. As I
have noted, the description of the English documents is incomplete, since I make no effort to
list the provisions in the English documents that ultimately found their way into the text of
the Constitution itself.
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While the four principal English rights-bearing documents
do not prefigure the internal structure of the Bill of Rights, two
organizational points do emerge. Rights of religious conscience and
petition for redress of grievances open two of the three documents
in which they appear, and protections against military oppression
occur in all four major documents, in three of them at or near the
document's beginning. Thus, by the time of the English Bill of
Rights in 1689, a very rough outline of our Bill of Rights-a
substantive description of religious and political rights, followed by
protection against military incursion, followed by protection against
civilian abuse-began to take shape.
B. The Colonial Charters
Colonial charters were the second set of rights-bearing
textual antecedents of the Bill of Rights. As with the English
historical documents, colonial charters contain many ideas that
reappear in the Bill of Rights, but none has an organizational
structure that resembles the Bill of Rights.
Three of the most elaborate colonial charters-the
Massachusetts Body of Liberties (1641), the Pennsylvania Frame of
Government (1682), and the New York Charter of Liberties and
Privileges (1683), all of which predate the English Bill of Rights,
are representative examples. The Massachusetts Body of Liberties
(1641) is an extraordinarily detailed compilation. Many of its
provisions contain ideas that reappear in the Bill of Rights, but in a
wholly different order. 122
The Pennsylvania Frame of Government (1682) contains an
explicit Bill of Rights. It begins with the right to vote and a
guaranty of free elections - 1st?; moves to a rudimentary speedy
trial clause - 6th; a jury clause - 6th and 7th; a provision governing
prisons and workhouses - 8th; a right to bail - 8th; and closes with
rights of religious conscience and worship - 1st.
The New York Charter of Liberties and Privileges (1683)
opens with a guaranty that no person may lose his property except
by a judgment of peers and by the laws of the province - 5th; moves
122. The order of ideas in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties is noted in Table B of the
Appendix, infra. It may be unfair to charge the Massachusetts Body of Liberties with
disorganization. In fact, real effort was made to organize the document by listing rights
against the legislature first, followed by rights during the judicial process, political liberties,
family rights, capital offenses, and religious liberty. It is enough to observe that the order,
such as it is, bears no resemblance to the Bill of Rights. See Massachusetts Body of Liberties,
in 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 71.
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to a jury clause - 6th and 7th; a Grand Jury clause - 5th; a bail
guaranty - 8th; a limit on quartering troops - 3rd; and closes with a
protection of religious conscience - 1st.' 23
Thus, while the colonial charters undoubtedly played a
significant role as a source of ideas for the Bill of Rights, they do
not appear to have provided an organizational model. If anything,
the tendency to place religious guaranties last outweighed the
halting move towards a chronological organization of procedural
rights that was occurring in the English documents.
C. The Revolutionary Declarations
The third set of rights-bearing documents preceding the Bill
of Rights were eighteen Revolutionary Constitutions and
Declarations of Rights. Not surprisingly, they contain the raw
material of the Bill of Rights. But no Revolutionary document
approximates the organizational structure of the Bill of Rights.
Prior to the Resolution of the Second Continental Congress
in 1776 calling for the drafting of state constitutions,' 24 four
Revolutionary rights compilations were circulated. The Virginia
Declaration of Rights and Grievances (1765) contained a jury trial
provision but nothing else traceable into the Bill of Rights. The
Massachusetts Statement of Rights of the Colonists and Listing of
Infringements (1772) opens with a call for religious conscience (to
all except Catholics) - 1st; assures equality before the law - 5th;
contains a takings clause - 5th; forbids general warrants - 4th, and
the quartering of troops - 3rd; assures local jury trials - 6th and 7th;
123. The other principal colonial charters present a similar difference in structure. The
Maryland Act for the Liberties of the People (1639) contains a rudimentary due process
clause. 1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 68. The Maryland Act Concerning Religion (1649)
contains a rudimentary religious freedom clause. 1 Id. at 91. The Charter of Rhode Island
(1663) contains an elaborate religious freedom clause, with the first recorded use of the term
"free exercise" of religious rights. 1 Id. at 96. The Fundamental Constitutions of Carolina,
drafted by John Locke, no less, contains rudimentary double jeopardy and jury trial clauses,
a prohibition on writing commentaries on the law, forced support for the Church of England,
a guaranty of religious toleration, an endorsement of slavery, and a duty to bear arms. 1 Id.
at 108. The Concessions and Agreement of West New Jersey (1677) contains a strong free
exercise clause - 1st; a jury trial clause - 6th and 7th; provisions on notice, confrontation, and
public trial - 6th; and a right to appear pro se - 5th. 1 Id. at 126. The Pennsylvania Charter
of Privileges (1701) contains elaborate provisions on religious freedom beginning with a right
of conscience to religious profession, worship and practice, continuing with a right to be free
from compulsion to do anything contrary to religious persuasion and closing with a ban on
religious tests for office - 1st; right to counsel and defendant's presentation of testimony - 6th;
a rudimentary takings clause; and a ban on seeking to amend the religious toleration clause.
1 Id. at 170.
124. 1 Id. at 229.
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and extols religious toleration - 1st. The Declaration of the First
Continental Congress (1774) complains of the loss of local jury
trials - 6th, interference with peaceful assembly and the right to
petition for redress of grievances - 1st, and of the maintenance of a
standing army in peacetime - 2nd and 3rd. Finally, the Address to
the Inhabitants of Quebec (1774) provides that life, liberty and
property are protected unless twelve peers of the vicinage agree -
5th, 6th and 7th; and explicitly assures freedom of the press,
perhaps for the first time - 1st.
The 1776 call of the Second Continental Congress provoked
an avalanche of rights-bearing documents from Virginia (1776),
New Jersey (1776), Pennsylvania (1776), North Carolina (1776),
Connecticut (1776), Delaware (1776), Maryland (1776), Georgia
(1777), New York (1777), Vermont (1777), South Carolina (1778),
Massachusetts (1780), and New Hampshire (1783). More ink was
spilled in the name of rights in the year following Congress'
Resolution than in the preceding 500 years of the English legal
tradition. But it was, to modern eyes, disorganized ink. No
Revolutionary document approximates the disciplined order of the
Bill of Rights.
As with the English documents, I do not claim that the
Revolutionary documents are without structure. A better
understanding of history might well reveal a careful organization.
It is enough to observe that the order of rights in the Revolutionary
documents does not resemble the structure ultimately chosen by
the Founders.
The Virginia Declaration of Rights (1776) was the first full-
scale Revolutionary compilation of rights. 25 It contains virtually
the entire raw material of the First through the Eighth
Amendments, but it does not anticipate the structure of the Bill of
Rights. 126
125. Two earlier rights-bearing documents circulated: a draft Constitution written by
Thomas Jefferson and the Declaration of Independence. Jefferson's Draft Virginia
Constitution (1776) opens with a guaranty of jury trial - 6th and 7th; assures female
inheritance; abolishes slavery; assures freedom of religion - 1st; bans compelled maintenance
of religious institutions - 1st; protects the right of all to bear arms - 2nd; forbids a standing
army - 2nd and 3rd; and guaranties a free press - 1st. 1 Id. at 243. Jefferson's draft contains
the first mention of the ill-fated amendment limiting pay raises for legislators to the next
sitting. The Declaration of Independence (1776) explicitly mentions only two ideas that
reappear in the Bill of Rights, a complaint about standing armies and the quartering of
troops - 2nd and 3rd; and a complaint about deprivation of the right to local jury trials - 6th.
1 Id. at 224.
126. For the order of rights in the Virginia Declaration of Rights, see Table C of the
Appendix, infra.
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Virginia's Declaration of Rights influenced the Pennsylvania
Declaration of Rights (1776), drafted by Benjamin Franklin and
Thomas Paine. 127 After a recitation that all are equally free and
independent, the Pennsylvania document opens with an elaborate
protection of religious freedom, including worship, freedom from
compulsory support of religion, the right to hold office and respect
for religious conscience - 1st; recites that people control the police -
4th; posits a duty to contribute to common protection, but adds a
right not to bear arms - 2nd; adds counsel to the list of procedural
rights spelled out in the Virginia Declaration - 6th; limits searches
and requires specific warrants - 4th; provides for civil juries - 7th;
assures freedom of speech and press - 1st; protects the right to bear
arms, forbids standing armies, and subordinates the military to
civilian rule - 2nd and 3rd; protects interstate travel - 5th?;
guaranties the rights of assembly, consultation, instruction of
representatives; petition and remonstrance - 1st; bans excessive
bail - 8th; requires that all fines be moderate - 8th; and explicitly
protects a free press - 1st.1 28 Once again, although the Pennsylvania
declaration is extraordinarily sophisticated, its structure does not
hint at the organizational rigor to come. 129
The North Carolina Declaration of Rights (1776) also
contains fragments of each of the first eight amendments, but not in
the order in which they finally appear. The North Carolina
declaration assures notice in a criminal case, confrontation, the
right to present evidence and protection from self-incrimination -
5th and 6th; adds a guaranty of grand jury indictment and
presentment - 5th; requires a unanimous jury in criminal cases -
6th; forbids excessive bail, excessive fines, and cruel and unusual
punishment - 8th; bans general warrants - 4th; prohibits
interference with life, liberty, or property except by law of the land -
5th; assures juries in civil cases - 7th; guarantees a free press - 1st;
protects the right to bear arms, forbids standing armies and
assures civilian control of the military - 2nd and 3rd; protects the
127. 2 Id. at 252-63.
128. 2 Id. at 263-75.
129. See 2 Id. at 263-75. New Jersey's 1776 Constitution, while lacking a formal Bill of
Rights, assured that a defendant could testify and be represented by counsel - 6th;
guaranteed free exercise of religious conscience -1st; prohibited taxation to support someone
else's religion - 1st; banned religious tests for office (as long as you were a Protestant); and
preserved trial by jury - 6th and 7th. 2 Id. at 276.
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rights of assembly and petition for redress - 1st; and assures
worship according to conscience - 1st.130
The Delaware Declaration of Rights (1776) assures the right
to worship, freedom from forced worship or support of religion and
prohibits interference with religious conscience - 1st; protects the
right to petition for redress of grievances - 1st; forbids taking
property without legislative consent - 5th; protects civil trial by jury
- 7th; assures notice, counsel, confrontation, right to present
evidence and call witnesses, speedy trial, impartial and unanimous
jury and the privilege against self-incrimination in criminal cases -
5th and 6th; forbids excessive bail, excessive fines and cruel and
unusual punishments - 8th; requires that warrants be specific and
on oath and forbids general warrants - 4th; extols a well regulated
militia and warns against standing armies - 2nd; bans quartering of
troops - 3rd; and guarantees freedom of the press - 1st.131
The Maryland Declaration of Rights protects civil jury trials
- 7th; assures the right to petition for redress - 1st; abolishes poll
taxes; and bans cruel and unusual punishments - 8th; protects
criminal venue - 6th; assures notice, the right to present a defense,
counsel, confrontation, subpoena power, cross examination, speedy
trial and an impartial, unanimous jury in criminal cases - 6th; bans
self-incrimination - 5th; prohibits loss of liberty and property except
by judgment of peers or law of the land - 5th; bans excessive bail,
excessive fines, and cruel and unusual punishment - 8th; extols a
citizens' militia, warns against standing armies, provides for
civilian control of the military, forbids quartering of troops and
limits martial law - 3rd and 5th; assures religious toleration and
right to be free from compulsory support of another's church - 1st;
bans religious tests for office; substitutes affirmations for oaths;
and assures a free press - 1st.132
The first two rights-bearing efforts of 1777 were in a minor
key. Georgia's Constitution (1777) protected criminal venue - 6th;
assured civil juries - 7th; guaranteed grand jury indictment - 5th;
assured free exercise of religion and freedom from duty to support
religion of others - 1st; banned excessive fine or bail - 8th; assured a
free press - 1st; and provided for jury trials in criminal cases -
6th.133 New York's Constitution (1777) provided that no one could
be disenfranchised or deprived of rights and privileges except by the
130. Connecticut's Declaration of Rights (1776) forbade deprivation of life, liberty, or
property unless clearly warranted by law - 5th; and assured a right to bail - 8th. 2 Id. at 289.
131. 2 Id. at 276-78.
132. 2 Id. at 280-85.
133. 2 Id. at 291-300.
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law of land or judgment of peers - 5th and 6th; assured free exercise
of religion - 1st; imposed a duty to bear arms, except for Quakers -
2nd; and provided for jury trials in criminal cases - 6th. 134
Vermont's Declaration of Rights (1777)135 contained a
takings clause - 5th; a guarantee of religious toleration and freedom
from compelled support of religion - 1st; a right not to bear arms,
the right to be heard in a criminal case, counsel, notice,
confrontation, right to present evidence, speedy and public trial,
vicinage, unanimous jury, and freedom from self-incrimination - 5th
and 6th; a right to be free from deprivations of liberty except by
laws or the judgment of peers - 5th; a requirement of specific
warrants only on oath - 4th; a right to jury trial in civil cases - 7th;
protection of free speech and free press - 1st; the right to bear arms
- 2nd; the right to travel - 5th?; and the right to assemble, to
instruct legislators, and to seek redress of grievances by address,
petition, or remonstrance - 1st. 136
The Vermont Constitution assembles for the first time in a
single document, but not in the same clause, the six ideas that
eventually coalesce into the First Amendment. The ideas appear in
the third, fourteenth, and eighteenth clauses of the Vermont
document. 137 Significantly, the inside out progression of the six
ideas in the Vermont Constitution is almost identical to their final
order in the First Amendment. The only difference is that free
exercise precedes establishment. 138
The last two states to enact Revolutionary declarations were
Massachusetts (1780) and New Hampshire (1783). When John
Adams drafted the Massachusetts Declaration of Rights (1780), he
was able to draw on the ten Revolutionary models that preceded
it.139 Not surprisingly, the Massachusetts declaration reaches a new
level of substantive sophistication. But, although the substance of
134. 2 Id. at 301-13.
135. Vermont did not succeed in separating from New Hampshire until 1787. Thus, the
Vermont Constitution of 1777 never went into effect. 2 Id. at 319.
136. 2 Id. at 319-24.
137. 2 Id. at 322-24.
138. South Carolina's Constitution (1778) shares several ideas in common with the Bill of
Rights: a rudimentary protection of religious worship and a freedom from compelled support
of religion, coupled with a ban on criticizing another's religion - 1st; a call for proportionate
penal laws - 8th; a guaranty against deprivation of life, liberty or property except by
judgment of peers or law of the land - 5th; and a guaranty of a free press - 1st. 2 Id. at 325.
139. 2 Id. at 337-44.
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the Bill of Rights is prefigured in the Massachusetts declaration,
the declaration does not prefigure the form of the Bill of Rights.1 40
The New Hampshire Bill of Rights (1783) closes the
Revolutionary era, and glimmers of the form as well as the
substance of the Bill of Rights begin to appear. Concern for
religious conscience opens both the Massachusetts and New
Hampshire declarations. 141 The substance and much of the internal
structure of the Fourth through Eighth Amendments are in place,
but the amendments themselves are not internally organized as in
the Bill of Rights. 142
D. The Founders' Era
It remained for the Founders to take the raw material of our
rights-bearing tradition and turn it into a precisely organized
whole. The Founders' era opens with the Northwest Ordinance and
the text of the Constitution itself,143 neither of which order rights
according to the structural principle underlying the Bill of
Rights.1 44 The Northwest Ordinance protects modes of worship and
religious sentiments - 1st; assures jury trials - 6th and 7th; assures
bail - 8th; requires moderate fines - 8th; bans cruel and unusual
punishments - 8th; bans deprivations except by judgment of peers
or law - 5th; and bans takings of property without compensation -
5th.
140. See Table D of the Appendix, infra, for the organization of rights in the
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights.
141. 2 Id. at 340, 375.
142. See id. at 340-44, 375-79. For the organization of rights in the New Hampshire
Declaration, see Table E of the Appendix, infra.
143. The text of the Constitution contains many of the provisions dealing with
democracy, legislative authority, separation of powers, independent judiciary, habeas corpus,
privileges and immunities, the primacy of civilian power and the rights of the states vis a vis
each other that appeared in earlier Revolutionary texts. But, apart from a guaranty of jury
trials in criminal cases - 6th; and a prohibition of religious tests for holding office - 1st, the
ideas in the Constitution do not preview the Bill of Rights. Charles Pinckney's belated effort
to add provisions protecting a free press and prohibiting the quartering of troops failed. The
free press clause was defeated 7-4. 2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 439.
144. The Articles of Confederation did not contain material that reappeared in the Bill of
Rights. A rudimentary privileges and immunities clause exhausts its right-bearing
language. 2 Id. at 383. The Articles contained, as well, a reserved powers clause that
anticipates the Tenth Amendment. Id.
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The responses of the states to the call to ratify the
Constitution provide the most direct raw material for the Bill of
Rights. 145 Formal requests for amendment were submitted by
Massachusetts, South Carolina, New Hampshire, Virginia, and
New York. North Carolina submitted a verbatim copy of Virginia's
request. Minority reports seeking amendments were submitted
from Delaware, Pennsylvania, and Maryland.
The first set of suggested amendments from Massachusetts
were unremarkable. They open with a protection of the state's
reserved powers - 10th; require grand jury indictments - 5th; and
assure jury trials in diversity cases - 7th. Samuel Adams's effort to
add provisions protecting a free press, conscience, the right to bear
arms, petition for redress, and unreasonable searches and seizures
failed. New Hampshire adopted the Massachusetts provisions, but
added a ban on quartering soldiers - 3rd; provided that Congress
shall make no law touching religion or infringing the rights of
conscience - 1st; and protected the right to bear arms - 2nd. 146
Virginia and New York proposed elaborate amendments
foreshadowing every concept in the Bill of Rights. While the
internal structure of the amendments shows a heightened
organizational structure, neither the Virginia 147 nor the New
York 148 amendments follow the order eventually adopted by the Bill
of Rights.
145. Opposition to the Constitution centered on the absence of a Bill of Rights. 2 Id. at
443. Federalist strategy called for ratification, coupled with a request for prompt
amendment. 2 Id. Anti-federalists urged defeat of the Constitution, in part because of the
failure to include a Bill of Rights. 2 Id. The order of ratification was Delaware (Dec. 2, 1787)
(minority call for amendments); Pennsylvania (Dec. 12, 1787) (minority call for amendments);
New Jersey (Dec. 18, 1787); Georgia (Jan. 2, 1788); Connecticut (Jan. 9, 1788); Massachusetts
(Feb. 6, 1788) (call for amendments); Maryland (April 26, 1788) (minority call for
amendments); South Carolina (May 23, 1788) (call for amendments); New Hampshire (June
21, 1788) (call for amendments); Virginia (June 25, 1788) (call for amendments); New York
(July 26, 1788) (call for amendments); North Carolina (Nov. 21, 1789) (call for amendments).
Rhode Island declined to ratify the Constitution. 3-4 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 439.
146. South Carolina's proposed amendments included only one idea that reappears in the
Bill of Rights - a call for protection of reserved state powers - 10th. 4 SCHWARTZ, supra note
111, at 739.
147. 4 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 756. For the order of rights in the Virginia
Amendments, see Table F of the Appendix, infra.
148. 4 SCHWARTZ, supra note 112, at 911-18. For the order of rights in the New York
Amendments, see Table G of the Appendix, infra.
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E. The Drafting of the Bill of Rights
Madison's genius was not substantive; it was structural.
Virtually every idea in the Bill of Rights had been widely rehearsed
at least twice: once in the Revolutionary declarations and, again, in
the numerous amendments proposed by the state ratifying
conventions. For example, the Virginia Declaration of Rights of
1776 contained elaborate criminal procedure protections that
presaged the Sixth and much of the Fifth Amendments. The
Massachusetts Declaration of Rights of 1780 presaged the ban on
unreasonable searches and seizures that became the Fourth
Amendment. The literal text of the Eighth Amendment appears in
the English Bill of Rights of 1689 and was commonplace in the
Revolutionary declarations. The substance and even the form of the
Second and Third Amendments appear repeatedly in the
Revolutionary declarations. The guaranty of civil jury trial in the
Seventh Amendment appears in all but two of the Revolutionary
declarations. The Vermont Constitution of 1777 united the six ideas
that eventually became the First Amendment, albeit in three
separate clauses.
In fact, every Revolutionary declaration contained some
protection of religious freedom and some protection of speech or
press. Madison himself observed that no idea was placed into his
June 8th draft of the Bill of Rights unless it had been sought by at
least three ratifying conventions.
Nothing in our rights-bearing tradition, however, prefigured
Madison's reworking of a set of broadly held, but randomly ordered,
intuitions about the indicia of freedom into a rigorously organized
blueprint for a free and democratic society. Most strikingly,
Madison perceived that rights of conscience, communication,
collective action and politics are intimately connected to one
another as the preconditions for democratic governance. Instead of
dispersing them, as had the Revolutionary declarations, Madison
gathered them into a unified description of the ideal commonwealth
for the first time in our legal tradition, in what became the First
Amendment.
Madison's efforts at structural coherence were initially
limited by his belief that the Bill of Rights should be interpolated
into the body of the Constitution itself at appropriate points. Thus,
his June 8th draft proposes one set of restrictions binding on
Congress to be interpolated in Article 1, Section 9 between clauses 3
and 4; a second set governing the states to be interpolated in Article
1, Section 10 between clauses 1 and 2; a third set restricting the
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judiciary to be inserted at the end of Article III, Section 2 and in
place of Section 2 clause 3; and a fourth set to be added as a new
Article VII.
The proposed limitations on the judiciary included jury trials
and venue in criminal cases, grand jury indictments, and civil jury
trials-ideas that would eventually appear in the final version in
the Sixth, Fifth, and Seventh Amendments. It was, however, the
organization of Madison's proposed limits on congressional
authority under Article I Section 9 that broke new conceptual
ground. Although important structural changes were still to come,
Madison's proposed additions to Article I, Section 9 begin the deep
structure of the Bill of Rights.149
Most importantly, Madison's June 8th proposal contains the
first effort to integrate the protections of conscience,
communication, collective action, and democracy into a single text.
Although his language was edited, and although Madison put free
exercise before establishment, his June 8th proposal determined
the structure and content of the First Amendment.
Madison also set the relationship between the First
Amendment and the rest of the Bill of Rights, placing the
protections against military abuse immediately after the
description of the ideal commonwealth, protections against civilian
abuse after the military clauses, and directions about retained
rights and reserved powers at the close of the document.
After desultory debate, on July 21, Madison's June 8th
proposals were referred to a Select Committee of Eleven, consisting
of one representative from each of the ratifying states, chaired by
Congressman Vining of Delaware, with Madison representing
Virginia. 150 The Committee of Eleven reported on July 28, retaining
the vast bulk of Madison's handiwork as well as Madison's
suggestion that the amendments be interpolated into the body of
the Constitution. Three important editorial changes were made in
the nascent First Amendment: establishment was placed before free
exercise, explicit protection of worship was temporarily collapsed
149. For a table including all of Madison's proposed amendments, see Table H of the
Appendix, infra. The proposed amendments to Article III involving criminal juries, venue,
grand jury indictment, and civil juries are not yet in their final order. 5 SCHWARTZ, supra
note 111, at 1042.
150. 5 Id. at 1061. The members of the Select Committee of Eleven were John Vining of
Delaware, James Madison of Virginia, Abraham Baldwin of Georgia, Roger Sherman of
Connecticut, Aedanus Burke of South Carolina, Representative Gilman of New Hampshire,
George Clymer of Pennsylvania, Egbert Benson of New York (the first Chief Judge of the
Second Circuit), Benjamin Goodhue of Massachusetts, Elias Boudinot of New Jersey, and
George Gale of Maryland.
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into protection of equal rights of conscience,1 51 and Madison's
cumbersome formula "speaking, writing and publishing" was
condensed into "speech." In addition, the rights to fair procedure in
criminal trials, ultimately codified in the Sixth Amendment
(originally envisioned by Madison as interpolations to Article I,
Section 9), were repositioned with the material to be interpolated
into Article III.
The House debated the Committee of Eleven's proposed
amendments from August 12-24, 1789. During the debates, an
explicit protection of free exercise reappeared, echoing Madison's
original protection of religious worship. But the most important
change made by the House was structural. After several false
starts, the House decided to place the Bill of Rights in a single
document instead of interpolating them into the body of the
Constitution. While Madison had already done much of the
organizing himself, especially of those provisions originally
designed to be interpolated into Article I, Section 9, the House
appointed a three-person Committee on Arrangement 152 to prepare
a final, self-contained version of the Bill of Rights. Two days later,
the Committee on Arrangement recommended two crucial
structural changes. For the first time, the provisions governing the
investigation phase (search and seizure) were placed before the
provisions governing prosecution, and the provisions governing trial
were placed after prosecution but before punishment. If Madison's
June 8th proposal fixed the formal order of the First Amendment
and its relation to the rest of the document, the unheralded
Committee on Arrangement, of which Madison was not a member,
fixed the order of investigation, prosecution, adjudication, and
punishment, giving the Bill of Rights structural integrity for the
first time. 153
The Senate debated the House version of the Bill of Rights
from September 2-9, 1789. During the Senate debates, Madison's
clause protecting the equal rights of conscience was deleted,
arguably because it merely restated the Establishment and Free
151. 5 Id. at 1145-46. The Senate would ultimately collapse equal rights of conscience
back into free exercise. 5 Id.
152. 5 Id. at 1158. The Committee on Arrangement consisted of Egbert Benson and
Roger Sherman, both of whom had served on the Select Committee of Eleven, and Theodore
Sedgwick of Massachusetts. Madison was not a member. 5 Id.
153. 5 Id. at 1146. The Committee on Arrangement made one other unfortunate
structural change that was vetoed by the Senate. The Committee broke Madison's protection
of the rights of conscience, communication, collective action, and democracy into two separate
articles, one dealing with religion and one dealing with speech, press, assembly and petition.
The Senate reunited the articles into a single unit. 5 Id.
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Exercise Clauses. 154 The final structural change was made when
provisions dealing with Grand Jury indictment were severed from
the petit jury provisions, with the Grand Jury clause opening the
section dealing with prosecution and the petit jury guaranties
remaining in the two sections dealing with adjudication-both civil
and criminal.1 55 While the Conference Committee made important
changes in wording, strengthening the Establishment Clause and
adding a criminal venue protection, the final, fully disciplined order
of the Bill of Rights was achieved when the Senate separated the
accusatory and adjudicative functions of the Grand and petit jury.
Finally, recognition of the unique structure of the Bill of
Rights is reinforced by a comparison with the French Declaration of
the Rights of Man and Citizen (1789).156 While the French
Declaration is substantively richer in its treatment of equality (the
formal concept of equality does not find its way into the United
States Constitution until the Reconstruction Amendments), its
effort to integrate democracy, rights theory, and natural law
(Madison's efforts to add an overarching theoretical preamble to our
Bill of Rights were rejected), and its visionary recognition of
economic and social rights (unlike the Northwest Ordinance, the
Bill of Rights ignores education and care of the poor), the French
Declaration displays a very different organizational structure. 157
The outlines of the French Declaration's organizational plan
are clear. After reciting that the general goal of government is to
protect the enjoyment of four natural rights: equality, liberty,
154. 5 Id. at 1146. The Committee of Eleven had also seen the equal right of conscience
clause as coterminous with the clause protecting religious belief and worship. It
recommended collapsing the belief and worship clause into the equal right of conscience
clause. 5 Id. The Senate simply reversed the order of collapse. 5 Id. The Senate deleted, as
well, Madison's effort to bind the states in the areas of religious freedom (expressed as equal
rights of conscience), free speech, free press, and criminal jury trials. 5 Id. Madison's efforts
to set a national minimum, binding on the states in areas crucial to liberty did not bear fruit
until the Supreme Court incorporated virtually the entire Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment's due process clause. Madison defeated an effort by the Senate to weaken
establishment protection in Conference and managed to reinsert a criminal venue clause. 5
Id. at 1159.
155. 5 Id. at 1147. The Senate rejected Madison's effort to limit appeals to the Supreme
Court, but salvaged his effort to preserve jury verdicts from appellate review, tucking it into
the Seventh Amendment as part of the protection of civil jury trial. 5 Id.
156. The Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen was adopted by the French
National Assembly on August 26, 1789. The text of the declaration is reproduced in the
Avalon Project of the Yale Law School, at www.yale.edullawweb/avalon/right of.htmt
declaration (last visited March 30, 2005).
157. See Table I of the Appendix, infra, for the structure of rights in the French
Declaration. The French Declaration is procedurally weaker than the Bill of Rights, lacking
many of the structural protections against governmental abuse contained in the Fourth
through Eighth Amendments, as well as an establishment clause.
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security and property, the French Declaration seeks to define the
minimum attributes of each. In one remarkable sense, though, the
two great rights-bearing documents resemble each other closely.
Each places the minimum attributes of an ideal political
commonwealth in an integrated clause for the first time.
Substantively, the only difference between the two clauses'
definitions of the fundamentals of liberty is the omission of an
establishment clause guaranty in the French Declaration.
Structurally, the French Declaration places protection of expression
before religion and places petition in a separate clause. The degree
of substantive consensus is extraordinary.
I hope that those of you who have survived the forced march
through history I have imposed on you in this section agree that the
final order of the Bill of Rights cannot be explained as a random
accident or an adoption of the obvious. The internal order and
organizational structure of the Bill of Rights stands as a triumph of
the Founders' coherent vision of what it takes to live as a free and
tolerant people in a functioning democracy.
V. DOES STRUCTURE AFFECT THE MEANING OF THE BILL OF RIGHTS?
Respect for structure is not a panacea for linguistic
uncertainty. Serious engagement with structure can, however,
provide a politically constrained judicial reader with a valuable,
principled tool for interpreting an ambiguous text. While the
structurally-driven readings of controversial provisions of the Bill of
Rights that follow are not the only possible readings, they are, I
believe, the best readings because they attempt to be faithful to
what matters most: the holistic text.
A. A Structural Reading of the Ninth and Tenth Amendments
Reading the Ninth and Tenth Amendments structurally as
metacanons of construction would have two effects. First, it would
permit judges to follow Justice Harlan's lead in using techniques
historically associated with the equity of the statute methodology to
supplement the text of our rights-bearing documents. Just as
freedom of association fits well as a nontextual extension of the
literal words of the First Amendment, the technique can be used
profitably to deal generally with interstitial lacunae in our rights-
bearing documents. More generally, the interplay between the
Ninth and Tenth Amendments provides a principled tie-breaking
mechanism to help a judge resolve close constitutional cases.
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Two significant cases decided during the 1994 Term of the
Supreme Court illustrate the role of the Ninth and Tenth
Amendments as tie-breakers in close cases.
In U.S. Term Limits v. Thornton, the Court was asked to
rule on whether the three textual eligibility criteria for Congress
recited in the Constitution-age, citizenship, and residence-
describe a constitutional ceiling or merely a floor.158  The
constitutional text itself does not answer the question. 159 Since a
literal reading does not yield an answer, the Court was challenged
to select the "best" reading. 160 Both sides produced extraordinary
efforts. Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, argued that the
"best" reading was a ceiling. States should not be permitted to
impose additional qualifications, he argued, because Congress is a
national body, designed to achieve a national perspective. 161 Since
congressional legislation affects everyone, Justice Stevens argued
that all voters have a reciprocal interest in the qualifications of
members of Congress, arguing for a single, uniform set of
qualifications.
Justice Thomas, writing for the dissent, argued that states
should be permitted to add new qualifications because members of
Congress should be seen as agents of the people of the several
states who select them. 162 According to Justice Thomas, the
fundamental duty of a member of Congress is to represent her
constituents, not the nation as a whole. Thus, argued Justice
Thomas, the constituents should be able to tailor the criteria of
representation to their wishes, as long as a substantive provision of
the Constitution is not violated.163
158. 514 U.S. 779, 783 (1995).
159. Art. I, § 2, cl. 2, provides: "No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have
attained to the Age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States,
and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen."
Art. I, § 3, cl. 3, provides: "No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the
Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not,
when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen."
160. Both Qualifications Clauses are silent on the minima/maxima question.
161. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 822 ("Permitting individual States to formulate diverse
qualifications for their representatives would result in a patchwork of state qualifications,
undermining the uniformity and the national character that the Framers envisioned and
sought to ensure.").
162. Id. at 858-60 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (arguing that the Representatives of each
State are agents of the people of that State, not agents of the "undifferentiated people of the
Nation as a whole").
163. Id. at 925. ("But laws that allegedly have the purpose and effect of handicapping a
class of candidates traditionally are reviewed under the First and Fourteenth Amendment
rather than the Qualifications Clause."). Thus, for example, it is common ground that racial
or gender qualifications would be invalid under the Equal Protection Clause.
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Each side produced formidable historical and philosophical
support for its descriptive position, although Justice Thomas's
opinion is perhaps too heavy on the pre-Civil War conception of the
nation. 164 Whether viewed in descriptive historical terms, or as a
philosophical choice between theories of representation, however,
the opposing sides battled to a textual draw in Term Limits. Both
opinions are right. Congress is an untidy institution reflecting the
untidy nature of our federal structure. It is designed both to reflect
the national common good (arguing in favor of a uniform, national
definition of eligibility) and to advance the parochial interests of the
states (arguing in favor of latitude in the states to add
qualifications).
When the dust clears, neither opinion succeeds in driving
the other from the field. What is needed, therefore, is a way to
break a textual tie between two plausible "best" readings of the
Qualifications Clause. Justice Kennedy's decisive concurrence 165
confronts the tie-breaking problem openly by admitting that he
reads the Qualifications Clause as a ceiling, not because he is
driven to do so by either text, history, or philosophy, but because a
contrary reading would interfere with the right to vote by denying
an individual voter the ability to support a candidate who lacks the
"new" qualification. In short, according to Justice Kennedy, the
burden of nonpersuasion rests on the side seeking to curtail the
exercise of an important right. That is exactly what the Founders
hoped the Ninth Amendment would do.
The second difficult textual case was United States v.
Lopez, 66 in which the Court was asked to decide whether a
congressional ban on guns in, or near, schools could be justified as a
164. Although the issue was not pressed, it is possible to argue that the pre-Civil War
conception of the nation favored Justice Thomas's position, while the post-Civil War
conception, evidenced by the Reconstruction Amendments, supported the Stevens position.
The important descriptive disagreement between Justices Stevens and Thomas over whether
a member of Congress is more committed to the common good or to the advancement of the
parochial interests of her constituents mirrors the debate between communitarians and
public choice theorists about the nature of representation in a democracy. See generally
Madison's Nightmare: The Tax-Driven Exclusion of Disinterested Voices from the Legislative
Process (1994) (discussing public choice and public interest theories in the context of
"describ[ing] the role of the tax system in shaping the legislative process", at http:
//www.law.nyu.edulncplllibrary/publications/Confl994Neubornepaper.pdf; Burt Neuborne,
Ghosts in the Attic: Idealized Pluralism, Community and Hate Speech, 27 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L.
REV. 371 (1992) (discussing the competing values of self and community in the context of
hate speech).
165. Term Limits, 514 U.S. at 844-45 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (arguing that the
imposition of "new" qualifications "exceeds the boundaries of the Constitution" because it
interferes with the "rights of resident voters in federal elections").
166. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).
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regulation of interstate commerce. As in Term Limits, the 1787
constitutional text fails to deliver a clear answer. Article I is a
visionary effort to divide power between the national government
and the states. The formal division of power is straightforward. As
with the Bill of Rights, the organization of the federalism
component of the 1787 text demonstrates a thoughtful effort at
structure and organization. Article I lays out the "vertical
federalism" rules governing the relationship between the national
government and the states in a logical sequence: Section 8 grants
specific powers to the national government, Section 9 denies specific
powers to the national government, and Section 10 denies specific
powers to the states. Article IV then sets out the "horizontal
federalism" rules governing the states' relationships with one
another. Even within the sections, concern with structure and
organization is evident. For example, Article I, Section 8 contains
eighteen clauses setting forth Congress's enumerated powers. The
first eight, dealing with taxation, borrowing, regulation of
commerce, bankruptcy (and naturalization), coining money,
preventing counterfeiting, building post roads and post offices, and
patent and copyright are powers needed to nurture the growing
economy. Even the ninth clause, granting power to establish
inferior courts, is related to commerce, since the fundamental
reason for the lower federal courts was to hear commercial disputes
between and among citizens of different states. The tenth clause,
granting power to punish piracy and offenses against the law of
nations, is transitional. Since both piracy and offenses against the
law of nations (as it existed in 1787) were commercial crimes, the
tenth clause looks back to the first nine. But since armed force is
contemplated, the piracy clause looks forward to Clauses 11
through 16, all of which relate to the governance and
administration of the armed forces. The two final clauses, Clauses
17 and 18, deal with administration of the District of Columbia and
with the grant of a general power to enact laws that are "necessary
and proper" to carry into execution the enumerated powers.
Care was also taken with the organization of the eight
clauses of Article I, Section 9, denying powers to the national
government. The first clause is the infamous promise to permit the
importation of slaves until 1808. Viewed as a perverted protection
of the slaveholders' substantive liberty, it fits well with Clauses 2
and 3, protecting habeas corpus and prohibiting bills of attainder
and ex post facto laws. Clauses 4 through 7 then govern the federal
government's financial powers, banning taxes unless in proportion
to the census, prohibiting export duties on goods exported from the
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states, requiring equal treatment of ports, and, most importantly,
forbidding spending that is not pursuant to an appropriation, and
subject to an accounting. The eighth clause bans titles of nobility.
The organizational structure of the three clauses of Article I,
Section 10, denying powers to the states, is less obvious. Clause 1 is
a catchall provision forbidding states from signing treaties,
granting letters of marque, coining money, using anything but gold
or silver coin as legal tender, passing bills of attainder, ex post facto
laws or laws impairing the obligation of contract, or granting titles
of nobility. Even within the catchall first clause, a loose
organization is discernible. The first two prohibitions-on treaties
and letters of marque-restrict a state's temptation to have a
foreign policy. The next two-limits on coining money and
establishing soft money legal tender-restrict a state's ability to
execute a debtor-driven commercial policy. The next three-bans on
bills of attainder, ex post facto laws, and laws impairing the
obligations of contract-are substantive rights protections (perhaps
related to fear of debtor-driven laws), and the last forbids titles of
nobility. This is hardly a model of organizational clarity, but it is
far from a random ordering.
Clause 2 restricts the states from imposing import or export
duties. Clause 3 forbids states from keeping troops, entering into
alliances, or engaging in war. The first two items in Clause 1-a
prohibition of treaties and letters of marque-fit more comfortably
into Clause 3. The third and fourth items in Clause 1--banning the
coining of money and the adoption of soft money legal
tender-arguably fit more comfortably into Clause 2. The
organizational redundancy in Section 10 is one of the relatively few
examples of sloppy structure in the federalism provisions of the
1787 document.
Article IV completes the 1787 text's effort to describe the
new federal structure by setting forth the rules governing the
states' relationships with one another. Article IV, Sections 1 and 2
describe reciprocal promises made by the states to each other.
Section 1 requires the grant of full faith and credit to the judgments
and public acts and records of another state. Article IV, Section 2,
Clause 1 guarantees the citizens of one state enjoyment of the
"privileges and immunities" of citizens in the several states. Both
provisions are linked by a common desire to assure that states
resist the temptation to discriminate in favor of their own citizens,
either by ignoring foreign judgments, or by setting up




Article IV, Section 2, Clauses 2 and 3, prevent one state from
seeking to interfere in the internal affairs of another state. Clause 2
provides for mandatory extradition from one state to another. It is
obviously linked with Clause 3, the Fugitive Slave Clause, designed
to avoid Somersetts Case,167 by forbidding free states from applying
the law of the forum to test demands for the return of escaped
slaves.
Article IV, Section 3 deals with future expansion. Clause 1
authorizes Congress to admit new states but forbids creating new
states from within, or by combining existing states. Clause 1 is both
a protection against the national government and a guarantee
against the territorial ambitions of neighboring states. Clause 2
authorizes Congress to administer the territories.
Article IV, Section 4 describes the collective obligations of
the states, organized as the United States, to each state. It
obligates the United States to guarantee a Republican form of
government to each state and assures individual states of federal
protection against invasion and, when desired, protection against
domestic violence.
Thus, an overview of the federalism provisions of the 1787
text demonstrates a careful organization and a straightforward
plan. But the challenge of defining the precise extent of federal
power has been anything but straightforward. First, the
enumerated powers described in Article I, Section 8 must be given
concrete meaning. The extended effort to define the meaning of
commerce is merely the best known example. The century-long
evolution of meaning from viewing "commerce" as either
transportation or the physical movement of goods, to a recognition
that "manufacture" is a part of commerce, is an example of the
textual difficulty. 168 Moreover, the pristine scheme of confining the
167. Somerset v. Stewart, 20 State Trials 1, 79-82 (K.B. 1772) (applying the law of the
forum to determine the lawfulness of slavery, thus effectively abolishing slavery in England).
168. See, e.g., Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 191-92 (1824) (holding that
navigation is within the meaning of commerce); United States v. E.C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1,
14 (1895) (holding that manufacturing precedes commerce such that they are distinct from
one another); Hammer v. Dagenhart, 247 U.S. 251, 272 (1918) (holding that the making of
goods and the mining of coal are not commerce); Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States,
295 U.S. 495, 546 (1935) (holding that the making of goods and the mining of coal are not
commerce); NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. 1, 37 (1937) (holding that the
power of Congress to protect interstate commerce is plenary and includes the power to
regulate conditions of manufacture). See also Alexander Hamilton, Opinion on the
Constitutionality of an Act to Establish a Bank (1791), reprinted in 8 PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 97 (H. Syrett ed., 1965); Thomas Jefferson, Opinion on the Constitutionality of a
National Bank (1791), reprinted in THE WORKS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 284 (P. Ford ed.,
1892-99).
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federal government to its enumerated powers was shaken by the
addition in Clause 18 of the "necessary and proper" authority,
which functions as an invitation to a theory of implied federal
power. 169 The invitation in the Necessary and Proper Clause can
lead to a theory of causation that permits regulation of behavior by
Congress based on its effect on an enumerated power, even though
the regulated activity, strictly speaking, falls outside the power.
By the time Congress enacted the statute in Lopez, a
combination of an expansive reading of commerce to include
manufacture and consumption taking place wholly in one place,
170
coupled with an extremely broad idea of causation, 171 had resulted
in a Congressional power to regulate commerce that verged on a
national police power. 172 In defense of the statute in Lopez, the
Solicitor General argued that guns in or near schools adversely
affect the educational climate, which, in turn, adversely affects the
quality of the work force. Thus, he argued, the statute was a
permissible exercise of Congress's power to regulate interstate
commerce. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the Court, argued
that the governments' theory that education is inherently linked to
commerce without any necessity of documenting the linkage would
authorize the creation of a national school board. 173 In effect, he
suggested, the theory would turn the Commerce Clause into a
national police power, since almost anything regulable under the
police power would have a similar linkage to an efficient
169. See McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. f4 Wheat.) 316, 344 (1819) (discussing the
possibility that the "necessary and proper" clause could expose the States "to great dangers,
and the most humiliating and oppressive encroachments" by the federal government).
170. See Jones & Laughlin Steel Co., 301 U.S. at 37 (stating that Congress can regulate
activities that are intrastate in character if they have such a close and substantial relation to
interstate commerce).
171. United States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 114 (1941) (adopting the broad view that
Congressional authority to regulate commerce is plenary and is limited only by specific
Constitutional restrictions); Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111, 125 (1942) ("But even if
appellee's activity be local and though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still,
whatever its nature, be reached by Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on
interstate commerce... ").
172. See, e.g., Champion v. Ames, 188 U.S. 321, 363 (1903) (holding that the
transportation of lottery tickets from one State to another is interstate commerce that may be
regulated by Congress); Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 258
(1964) ("Thus the power of Congress to promote interstate commerce also includes the power
to regulate local incidents thereof... "); Katzenbach v. McClung, 379 U.S. 294, 302 (1964)
(holding that Congressional power to regulate commerce "extends to activities of retail
establishments, including restaurants, which directly or indirectly burden or obstruct
interstate commerce"); Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971) ("Extortionate credit
transactions, though purely intrastate, may in the judgment of Congress affect interstate
commerce.").
173. U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 565.
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economy. 174 Accordingly, writing for the Court, the Chief Justice
held that when Congress seeks to regulate noneconomic activity, it
must demonstrate the linkage between the noneconomic activity
and the commerce power. 175 When, however, economic activity is
the target of the regulation, the strong presumption of causation
would permit Congress to dispense with a formal showing of
causation. Challengers would bear the burden of proving that the
required causal nexus did not exist.
The Chief Justice's opinion in Lopez implies that once
Congress makes its required showing, the Court would use a highly
deferential rational basis standard to test its validity.176 If Lopez
requires merely that Congress put its thought process on the record
whenever it seeks to regulate noneconomic activity under the
commerce clause, the opinion is hardly revolutionary. 177
Justices Souter and Breyer, writing in dissent, argued that
the Court should uphold congressional regulation under the
Commerce Clause, even in the absence of a formal factual
predicate, if the reviewing court is able to construct the predicate
for itself. 78 Justice Breyer questioned the need for Congress to go
through the formalistic ritual of putting on the legislative record
material that is well known and fully available to the Court. Justice
Breyer then proceeded to lay out a formidable array of social science
data that demonstrates the close link between safety, effective
education, and an efficient workforce.
The text of the Commerce Clause supports both the
Rehnquist and the Souter/Breyer opinions. When questions arise
about the sufficiency of an alleged link between a noncommercial
activity and commerce, the text of the Commerce Clause is silent
about who should bear the risk of nonpersuasion. Indeed, from the
beginning, we have disagreed vigorously over the impact of the
Necessary and Proper Clause on the regime of enumerated powers.
174. Id. at 564.
175. See id. at 567 ("The possession of a gun in a local school zone is in no sense an
economic activity that might, through repetition elsewhere, substantially affect any sort of
interstate commerce.").
176. See id. at 562-63 (discussing the importance of congressional findings in the Court's
evaluation of legislative judgment).
177. Even read narrowly, Lopez is significant, since it is the first time in sixty years that
the Court has rebuffed Congress's effort to invoke the commerce clause in support of an
exercise of Congressional authority.
178. Lopez, 514 U.S. at 615. Justice Stevens and Ginsburg also dissented. Traditional
"rational basis" analysis requires a court to uphold a challenged practice if a rational basis
can be imagined to support it, without any inquiry into whether the legislature was actually
motivated by it.
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Thus, as with the Term Limits case, Lopez forces us to confront the
meaning of a key provision of the 1787 text, but it does not yield a
textual, historical, or philosophical answer. Once again, what is
needed is a way to break the linguistic tie between a reading of the
Commerce Clause that places the burden of proving a factual nexus
between a regulated activity and an enumerated power on the
government, and one that excuses the government from developing
a factual record, relying instead on the courts to imagine a post hoc
justification, if one can be shown to exist.
Excellent policy arguments exist on both sides. The
Rehnquist position has the institutional benefit of assuring that
Congress actually thinks about the link before it enacts statutes on
the margin between commerce and a national police power. The
Souter/Breyer opinion has the benefit of avoiding unnecessarily
formalistic approaches to legislation. If everyone knows that the
sun comes up, why make Congress go through the formal exercise
of putting the fact on the record? If text, history, and policy do not
yield the answer, which argument should prevail?
As in Term Limits, Justice Kennedy alone faced up to the
textual tie and sought a tie-breaking mechanism to guide his vote.
Viewing the case as a question of the existence of federal power, he
ruled that doubts about the existence of federal power should be
resolved against its existence. Thus, he placed the risk of
nonpersuasion in a "powers" case on the federal government. A
blank record in a tie case causes the federal government to lose.
In Term Limits, Justice Kennedy broke the textual tie in
favor of the exercise of an individual right; in Lopez, he broke the
textual tie against the existence of federal power. Alone among the
Justices, Justice Kennedy was in the majority in both Term Limits
and Lopez, applying a tie breaker in favor of federal power in Term
Limits and against the federal government in Lopez. The other
eight Justices went down the line in support of their conception of
federal powers or states rights. Justices Stevens, Ginsburg, Souter,
and Breyer voted in favor of the federal position in both cases. Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas voted
in favor of the states' position in both cases.
I believe that Justice Kennedy was not only right on the
merits in both cases, but that he is well on the way to a
jurisprudence that uses the structure of the Bill of Rights,
especially the Ninth and Tenth Amendments, to break textual ties
in close cases -- just what the Founders had in mind when they




B. A Structural Reading of the First Amendment
Once it is understood that Ninth Amendment equity of the
statute authorizes the use of analogy, inference, and implication in
reading the First Amendment's text, the theoretical underpinnings
of several nontextual constitutional rights like freedom of
association, the right to vote, a secular right of conscience, and
several recent controversial privacy and substantive due process
decisions become much less problematic. Each is explicable as an
application of Ninth Amendment equity of the statute to the First
Amendment.
As we have seen, Justice Harlan's recognition of a seventh
nontextual right-freedom of association-in the First Amendment
is a classic exercise of equity of the statute analogy contemplated by
the Ninth Amendment. 179 If association fits neatly between press
and assembly, the right to vote and to run for office is equally
comfortable following petition. When petition fails, resort to the
ballot is the next logical democratic act. If association is necessary
to the enjoyment of several textually enumerated rights, suffrage is
the key to virtually all other rights. If association is closely
analogous to several textually enumerated rights, voting is both a
quintessential expression of individual political belief and an effort
to associate with like-minded voters, as well as the candidate.
Perhaps most importantly, the order of rights in the First
Amendment reflects the life-cycle of the democratic process. Thus,
using the Ninth Amendment as a canon of construction, the First
Amendment may be read as protecting the right to vote and to run
for office.
Unfortunately, for most of our history, the Supreme Court
invoked the wrong canon in deciding voting cases. Using precisely
the type of inclusio unius reasoning the Ninth Amendment was
intended to forestall, the Court had repeatedly refused to grant
general federal constitutional protection to the right to vote and to
run for office because no such protections appeared in the
constitutional text.180 In fact, the Court did not begin to protect the
179. See generally NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S.
479 (1960); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963); Gibson v. Florida Legislative
Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539 (1963); Healy v. James, 408 U.S. 169 (1972); NAACP v.
Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886 (1982).
180. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1875) (upholding disenfranchisment of
women); and Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475, 486-88 (1903) (declining to interfere with state
disenfranchisement of blacks) are the leading examples. Modern examples of exclusio unius
reading of the constitutional text in voting settings include: Lassiter v. Northampton County
Board of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 53-54 (1960) (upholding literacy tests); Richardson v.
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right to vote until 1965181 and the right to run for office until
1968.182 Even then, the Court ignored the First Amendment, basing
constitutional protection of the franchise on the Equal Protection
Clause, thus linking the right to vote to the unstable vagaries of
fundamental rights jurisprudence.1 83 This is not the place to
attempt a democracy-centered reading of the First Amendment.
Suffice it to say that if the Court disentangled the law of democracy
from the Equal Protection Clause and viewed protection of
democracy as a structural imperative of the First Amendment, our
democracy jurisprudence might look very different. For one thing,
the correct outcome in Bush v. Gore,184 would turn on the
substantive right to vote, not on equality distinctions invisible to
the naked eye. Similarly, the outcome in Vieth v. Jubelirer, would
require discussion of the idea of fair representation in a democracy,
not whether equality norms are violated by outrageous partisan
gerrymanders. 185
Unlike recognizing a First Amendment right to participate
in the democratic process, invoking equity of the statute to
recognize a First Amendment secular right of conscience is not
merely a matter of avoiding inclusio unius thinking. After all,
Madison's effort to insert explicit textual protection against state
interference with the "equal right of conscience" was initially
rejected by the House, reinstated in the final House version and
ultimately rejected by the Senate. While a possible explanation for
Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54-56 (1974) (upholding disenfranchisement of felons). See also
Williams v. Mississippi, 170 U.S. 213, 223-25 (1898) (upholding broad discretion to determine
voter qualifications); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 554-57 (1875) (holding that
the Fifteenth Amendment does not bar states from prescribing the qualifications of electors);
United States v. Reese, 92 U.S. 214, 217-18 (1875) (holding that the Fifteenth Amendment
does not confer the right of suffrage). Voting was, of course, granted important textual
protection by the Fifteenth, Nineteenth, and Twenty-sixth amendments, extending the
franchise to racial minorities, women, and eighteen year olds. Indeed, of the seventeen
amendments enacted since the Bill of Rights, eleven seek to improve the democratic process.
181. Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 96 (1965). Carrington was quickly followed by
Harper ?. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 666-67 (1966), and Kramer v. Union Free
School District No. 15, 395 U.S. 621, 636-37 (1969). The cases, which utilized the equal
protection clause as a bootstrap for the missing substantive text, triggered an avalanche of
voting cases. See Burt Neuborne, Toward a Democracy-Centered Reading of the First
Amendment, 93 NW. L. REV. 1055, 1059 n. 23 (1999).
182. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 31 (1968) (holding that no state can pass a law
regulating elections that violates the equal protection clause); see also Neuborne, supra note
181, at 1059 n. 24.
183. Compare Rosario v. Rockefeller, 410 U.S. 752 (1973) with Kusper v. Pontikes, 414
U.S. 51 (1973).
184. 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
185. 124 S.Ct. 1769 (2004).
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
the rejection is the apparent belief of at least some members of both
the House and Senate that Madison's formulation merely restated
the protection already granted by the establishment and free
exercise combination,18 6 the rejection of Madison's language creates
a real obstacle to using equity of the statute to protect secular
conscience. Nevertheless, I believe that Justice Harlan's
constitutional protection of secular conscience in United States v.
Seeger 8 7 was a defensible, indeed preferable, use of the technique.
Secular conscience fits neatly into the First Amendment's
logical progression from internal belief to external politics. The
inside out structure of the First Amendment reflects a remarkable
understanding of the ontogeny of democratic governance. The
Founders knew that without effective protection of the interior of
the human spirit, free discussion and debate could not ripen into a
stable and collaborative government. And while the protection of
religious conscience explicitly provided in the text is of critical
importance to any effort to build a free society, religious conscience
does not exhaust the range of internal protections that are the
necessary preconditions of a functioning democracy. Protection of
secular conscience is equally needed.
In the 200 years that separate us from the Founders, the
concept of conscience has undergone a dramatic expansion. In the
late eighteenth century, conscience and religious belief were
coterminous to many, perhaps most Americans. With the decline of
religion as an all-pervasive organizing force, however, secular
substitutes for religion have emerged as the driving force in the
lives of many. To the extent secular conscience functions for many
today identically to religious conscience in providing the organizing
core of an individual's life, it would be arbitrary in the sense of
equity of the statute to protect one and ignore the other. Indeed, I
believe that the primary structural role of the Ninth Amendment is
to authorize readers of the constitutional text to recognize just such
changed circumstances and to permit the use of analogy to cope
with them.
Construction techniques associated with equity of the
statute provide a plausible account, as well, of cases protecting
intimate association from arbitrary governmental interference.
When Justice Powell refused in Moore v. Village of East Cleveland
186. Madison's original draft of the First Amendment contained several redundancies
ultimately subsumed under the word "speech." At several stages in the process, the House
treated Madison's provision on conscience as interchangeable with free exercise. See 5
SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 153.
187. 380 U.S. 163, 173-80 (1965).
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to permit a zoning ordinance to destroy an extended family, he
couched his opinion in substantive due process terms.188 It would, I
suggest, be more persuasive as an application of equity of the
statute similar to Justice Harlan's in NAACP v. Alabama.18 9 Justice
Harlan mapped the associational space in the First Amendment
needed for external politics. His right of political association looked
outward, fitting neatly before assembly and petition. Justice
Powell's protection of internal association looks the other way along
the First Amendment's axis, inward to the relationships that
nurture the human spirit: marriage, family, and friendship. As
Professor Karst has suggested, many of the Court's privacy and
substantive due process cases can be reinterpreted as a sustained
effort to protect a freedom of intimate association that is latent in a
First Amendment read against the background of the equity of the
statute.190
VI. CONCLUSION
Reading the Bill of Rights holistically as you would a great
poem does not eliminate hard cases. It does, however, direct a
judicial reader to a confrontation with the text in ways that are
deeper and more likely to generate coherence than other competing
ways to read the document. We owe the text the effort.
188. 431 U.S. 494, 500-06 (1977).
189. 357 U.S. 449, 462 (1958).
190. See Kenneth Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L. J. 624 (1980). I
have attempted to describe the Court's efforts to prevent government from placing obstacles








Order of Rights in Magna Carta
Order of Rights in Magna Placement in Bill of Rights
Carta
Freedom of English church First Amendment
Rights of local autonomy Tenth Amendment
Access to courts at definable Fifth and Sixth Amendments
place and time
Proportionality of fines Eighth Amendment
Earls and Barons tried only Sixth Amendment
by peers
No seizure of property Fifth Amendment
without compensation




No serious punishment Fifth Amendment
without lawful judgment or
law of the land (due process)
Right to travel abroad Fifth Amendment ?
Respect for territorial Fifth and Sixth Amendments
jurisdiction of courts
Foreign troops withdrawn Third Amendment
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Table B
Order of Rights in the Massachusetts Body of Liberties
Order of Rights: Placement in Bill of Rights
Massachusetts Body of
Liberties
No loss of life or property Fifth Amendment
except according to law
Oaths only if prescribed by First Amendment
General Court- religious
freedom
No seizure of property for Fifth Amendment
public use without just
compensation
Right to travel Fifth Amendment?
Pretrial bail guaranteed Eighth Amendment
Notice provisions Sixth Amendment
Limit on technical reversals of Seventh Amendment
jury verdicts
Right to unpaid assistance in Sixth Amendment
court
Right to written pleadings Sixth Amendment
Mutual consent for judge; jury; Sixth and Seventh Amendments
right to jury challenge for cause
Protection of jury fact-finding Seventh Amendment
Speedy trial Sixth Amendment
Double jeopardy Fifth Amendment
Limit on whipping Eighth Amendment
Limit on torture Eighth Amendment
No infamous, barbarous or Eighth Amendment
cruel bodily punishment
Defendant has right to put in Sixth Amendmentproof
Primacy of civil over religious First Amendment
jurisdiction
Narrow right to decline to Fifth Amendment?
testify on grounds of conscience
Protection of local government Tenth Amendment
Right to cast dissenting vote First Amendment?
Right to abstain First Amendment?
Right of Christian dissenters to First Amendment
worship
1 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 71.
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Table C
Order of Rights in the Virginia Declaration of Rights
Order of Rights: Virginia Placement in Bill of Rights
Declaration of Rights
No taxes or taking of private Fifth Amendment
property for public use without
legal ground
Notice of charges in criminal Sixth Amendment
cases
Confrontation Sixth Amendment
Defendant's right to present Sixth Amendment
evidence
Speedy trial Sixth Amendment
Jury trial Sixth Amendment
Criminal venue Sixth Amendment
Self-incrimination Fifth Amendment
No deprivation of liberty except Fifth Amendment
by law of land or judgment of
peers
No excessive bail Eighth Amendment
No excessive fines Eighth Amendment
No cruel and unusual Eighth Amendment
punishment
No general warrants Fourth Amendment
Jury trial in civil cases Seventh Amendment
Free press First Amendment
Guaranty of militia; ban on Second and Third Amendments
standing armies
Free exercise of religion First Amendment
Duty of toleration First Amendment
2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 231-36.
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Table D
Order of Rights in the Massachusetts Declaration
Order of Rights in the Placement in Bill of
Massachusetts Declaration Rights
Right to worship as you wish First Amendment
Power to establish churches rejected in First
Amendment
Compensation for takings for public use Fifth Amendment
Notice of charges in criminal cases Sixth Amendment
No self-incrimination Fifth Amendment
Right to present favorable evidence Sixth Amendment
Right to counsel or pro se appearance Sixth Amendment
No deprivation except by judgment of Fifth Amendment
peers or law of the land
Right to jury trial before infamous Sixth Amendment
punishment
Criminal venue Sixth Amendment
Freedom from unreasonable searches Fourth Amendment
Freedom from unreasonable seizures Fourth Amendment
Warrants must be supported by oaths Fourth Amendment
Warrants must be specific Fourth Amendment
Civil jury trial Seventh Amendment
Free press First Amendment
Right to keep and bear arms for the Second Amendment
common defense
Freedom of assembly First Amendment
Right to instruct representatives rejected
Right to request of legislature through First Amendment
address, petition or remonstrance
No excessive bail Eighth Amendment
No excessive fines Eighth Amendment
No cruel and unusual punishment Eighth Amendment
No quartering troops Third Amendment
2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 369-73.
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Table E
Order of Rights in the New Hampshire Declaration
Order of Rights in Placement in Bill of Rights
New Hampshire Declaration
Freedom to worship First Amendment
No obligation to support another's religion First Amendment
Right not to bear arms Rejected- Second Amendment
Notice of criminal charges Sixth Amendment
No self-incrimination Fifth Amendment
Right to present evidence Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Sixth Amendment
Counsel or pro se appearance Sixth Amendment
No deprivation without judgment of peers Fifth Amendment
or law of the land
Double jeopardy Fifth Amendment
Jury trial for capital crimes Sixth Amendment
Criminal venue/vicinage Sixth Amendment
Proportional penalties Eighth Amendment
Freedom from unreasonable searches Fourth Amendment
Freedom from unreasonable seizures Fourth Amendment
Warrants on oath Fourth Amendment
Specific warrants Fourth Amendment
Civil jury trials Seventh Amendment
Freedom of the press First Amendment
No quartering soldiers Third Amendment
Freedom of assembly First Amendment
Right to instruct representatives Rejected
Petition by remonstrance for wrongs and First Amendment
grievances
No excessive bail Eighth Amendment
No excessive fines Eighth Amendment
No cruel and unusual punishment Eighth Amendment
2 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 340-44, 375-79.
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Table F
Order of Rights in Virginia Amendments
2079
Order of Rights in Virginia Placement in Bill of Rights
Amendments
Notice in criminal cases Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Sixth Amendment
Right to present evidence Sixth Amendment
Counsel Sixth Amendment
Jury Sixth Amendment
Criminal venue Sixth Amendment
Unanimous jury Omitted
Privilege against self-incrimination Fifth Amendment
No deprivation of life, liberty or property Fifth Amendment
unless by law of land
Civil jury trial Seventh Amendment
No excessive bail Eighth Amendment
No excessive fine Eighth Amendment
No cruel and unusual punishments Eighth Amendment
No unreasonable searches Fourth Amendment
No unreasonable seizures Fourth Amendment
No general warrants Fourth Amendment
Right of assembly First Amendment
Petition for redress First Amendment
Free speech First Amendment
Free press First Amendment
Right to bear arms Second Amendment
No quartering troops Third Amendment
Free exercise of religion First Amendment
No establishment of religion First Amendment
Retained powers of states respected Tenth Amendment
Enumerated rights do not denigrate other Ninth Amendment
rights 1___
4 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 756.
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Table G
Order of Rights in New York Amendments
Order of Rights in New York Placement in Bill of Rights
Amendments
Respect for retained rights Ninth and Tenth Amendments
Free exercise of religion First Amendment
No establishment of sects First Amendment
Right to bear arms Second Amendment
No quartering troops Third Amendment
No deprivation without due process of law Fifth Amendment
Double jeopardy Fifth Amendment
No excessive bail Eighth Amendment
No excessive fines Eighth Amendment
No cruel and unusual punishment Eighth Amendment
Grand jury indictment Fifth Amendment
Speedy trial Sixth Amendment
Public trial Sixth Amendment
Jury trial in criminal cases Sixth Amendment
Criminal venue Sixth Amendment
Unanimous verdicts Omitted
Notice of charges Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Sixth Amendment
Right to present evidence Sixth Amendment
Counsel Sixth Amendment
No self-incrimination Fifth Amendment
Civil jury trial Seventh Amendment
No unreasonable searches Fourth Amendment
No unreasonable seizures Fourth Amendment
No general warrants Fourth Amendment
Free assembly First Amendment
Petition for redress First Amendment
Free press First Amendment
4 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 911-18.
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Table H
Order of Rights in Madison's June 8th Draft
Order of Rights: Madison's June 8th Placement in Bill of Rights
Draft
Right to religious belief First Amendment
Right to religious worship First Amendment
No establishment First Amendment
Equal rights of conscience omitted
Right to speak First Amendment
Right to write omitted
Right to publish omitted
Free press First Amendment
Free assembly First Amendment
Petition for redress First Amendment
Right to bear arms Second Amendment
Conscientious objection to bearing arms omitted
No quartering troops Third Amendment
Double jeopardy Fifth Amendment
No self-incrimination Fifth Amendment
No deprivation without due process Fifth Amendment
No taking private property except for public Fifth Amendment
use
Just compensation for taking private property Fifth Amendment
No excessive bail Eighth Amendment
No excessive fines Eighth Amendment
No cruel and unusual punishments Eighth Amendment
No unreasonable searches Fourth Amendment
No unreasonable seizures Fourth Amendment
Specific warrants under oath Fourth Amendment
Speedy trial Sixth Amendment
Notice of charge Sixth Amendment
Confrontation Sixth Amendment
Compulsory process Sixth Amendment
Counsel Sixth Amendment
Nondisparagement of retained rights Ninth Amendment
No state interference with conscience omitted
No state interference with press omitted
No state interference with jury trial rights omitted
Limits on appeals to Supreme Court omitted
Limits on appellate review of facts Seventh Amendment
Jury trial in criminal cases Sixth Amendment
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Criminal venue Sixth Amendment
Grand jury protection Fifth Amendment
Civil jury trials Seventh Amendment
Separation of powers clause omitted
Reserved powers to states Tenth Amendment
5 SCHWARTZ, supra note 111, at 1042.
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Table I
Rights in the French Declaration
1. The right of petition in the French Declaration is located in a separate clause toward the
close of the document. The Declaration also contains separate clauses protecting the equal
right to run for office, the equal right to vote, and an early term limitation clause. The Bill of
Rights says nothing about participating in the democratic process, except for the right to
petition.
French Protections of Liberty First Amendment
Right to express opinions by press or No establishment of religion
otherwise
Right to assembly Free exercise of religion
No interference with right of worship Free speech
Right of petition1  Free press
Right of assembly
Right of petition

